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INTRODUCTION
At 4:30 a.m. on October 15, 1982, John Henry Sansregret broke into
the home of his former girlfriend and terrorized her for the second
time in less than a month.' He tore the telephone from the wall to
prevent her from calling for help and threatened her with a butcher
* Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. I would like to thank Alafair
Burke and Susan Herman for their careful reading and insightful comments on the
article in draft; Lisa Spar, Nancy Anderson, Monica Austin, and Nicholas Ciappetta
for assistance with research; and Eric Linder for his exceptionally dedicated help
under deadline.
1. Sansregret v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 570, 572-73 (Can.). As this citation
indicates, the name "Sansregret" is not fictional, though, given the facts, it might seem
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knife.2 While he repaired a window to conceal his entry, he ordered
her to undress and stand in the doorway so that she could not escape.'
He tied her hands behind her back, struck her on the mouth so hard
that she bled, and rammed the knife blade several times into the wall
very close to her, announcing that if he had found her with a
boyfriend he would have killed them both.4 In fear for her life, she
calmed him as she had on the previous occasion, by pretending that
they might reconcile and by having sexual intercourse with him.5 As
before, she reported the incident to the authorities as soon as she was
safely able, claiming she had been raped.'
But had she been raped? At a colloquial level, the question seems
preposterous. No one in their right mind could have imagined that
she was truly consenting to intercourse under the circumstances.7
Indeed, she asserted that she "didn't consent at any time,"' and every
one of the judges who heard the case concluded that she had not
freely or genuinely consented. Surely this is rape. But in the
complicated world of criminal mens rea, the question is not
outrageous and the answer is not so clear. In fact, the trial court
found that Sansregret had not raped his ex-girlfriend, and there were
three separate opinions and rationales in the Court of Appeal, only
two of them concluding that there had been a rape.9 The Supreme
Court of Canada confirmed that the defendant was guilty of rape, but
only by invoking for the first time in the case, and in a somewhat
questionable way, the doctrine of willful blindness."'
The law of rape has changed in Canada since the incident involving
Sansregret. 11 It has also changed in significant respects in many other
common-law countries and, over the past twenty years or so, in most
jurisdictions the United States as well, including with respect to mens
rea. 2 Yet, despite the widespread reform of rape law, the Sansregret
2. Id. at 573.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 572-73.
6. Id. at 572, 574.
7. R. v. Sansregret, [1983] 22 Man. R.2d 115, 118 (Can.) ("No rational person,
hearing that conversation, having witnessed what preceeded [sic] it, witnessing the
knife in the accused's hand, could possibly have believed that the complainant's
responses were genuine and were induced by anything other than fear.").
8. Sansregret, 1 S.C.R. at 573.
9. Sansregret, 22 Man. R.2d 115 (trial court); R. v. Sansregret, [1983] 25 Man.
R.2d 123 (Can.) (Court of Appeal).
10. Sansregret, 1 S.C.R. at 583-88; see discussion infra Part I.E.2.
11. Sansregret, 1. S.C.R. at 572 (noting that the applicable section of the Canadian
Criminal Code had been repealed and significant changes made in this area of the law
while the case was on appeal); see also Confronting Sexual Assault: A Decade of
Legal and Social Change (Julian V. Roberts & Renate M. Mohr eds., 1994); John M.
Williams, Mistake of Fact: The Legacy of Pappajohn v. The Queen, 63 Can. Bar R.
597, 601 & nn. 6-7 (1985).
12. See Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Law § 33.01.[B], at 569-70 & n.8
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case presents an interesting window into the still confusing and often
controversial world of criminal mens rea in general, and willful
blindness in particular.
Viewed more broadly, Sansregret illustrates a problem that could
occur in any case involving a crime that requires for conviction
knowledge of some important fact. Knowledge-level crimes include
such commonplace occurrences as drug offenses (manufacture,
distribution, possession, and importation),13 fraud (theft by false
pretenses,14 writing a check for insufficient funds, 5 making a false
statement to governmental or public authorities16), perjury, 7
obstruction of justice,"8 and receipt of stolen property. 9 What makes
these cases difficult is that the prosecutor must prove something about
the defendant's inner thoughts, that he or she was subjectively aware
of the fact in question. Alternatively, a prosecutor may establish guilt
of a knowledge-level crime by proving that a defendant was not
actually aware of the fact only because he or she deliberately avoided
positive knowledge of it, thus invoking the doctrine of willful
blindness. However, as in Sansregret, there is a third possibility as
well. A defendant may be neither subjectively aware of the fact in
question nor willfully blind to it, but, at the same time and more
importantly, also not morally innocent of the harm contemplated by
the criminal prohibition. How should we conceptualize this situation
and how should the criminal law respond, perhaps to accommodate
conviction?
In the course of exploring these issues, this article reviews some new
thoughts on old and new mental states to see what they tell us about
criminal culpability generally. It examines the rationale for adoption
(3d ed. 2001); Susan Estrich, Real Rape 80-91 (1987); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation and the Failure of Law 17-46 (1998);
Leigh Bienen, Rape III- National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6
Women's Rts. L. Rep. 170 (1980).
13. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2001) (outlawing knowing manufacture, distribution,
and possession with the intent to distribute certain listed controlled substances); id. §
844 (1991) (outlawing knowing possession); id. §§ 952, 960 (1999 & 2001) (outlawing
knowing importation).
14. Dressier, supra note 12, § 32.10[C][3], at 567; Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law
§ 8.7(f), at 839 (3d ed. 2000).
15. LaFave, supra note 14, § 8.9(b), at 853.
16. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000) (outlawing knowingly making false
statements in matters within the federal government's jurisdiction); see also id. § 287
(outlawing knowingly presenting a false claim against the United States or any of its
departments or agencies).
17. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2000) (outlawing willfully making a false statement
while under oath to testify truthfully); United States v. Bronston, 453 F.2d 555 (2d
Cir. 1971) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1621 requires defendant's knowledge of the falsity
of his statements), rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 352 (1973).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (holding that an
obstruction of justice violation required knowledge of the proceeding the defendant
was alleged to have obstructed).
19. LaFave, supra note 14, § 8.10(d), at 858.
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of a knowledge requirement for a variety of crimes, including rape,
drug offenses, and certain kinds of fraud. It explores the reasons why
rape reform has often resulted in reducing this requirement to
recklessness, negligence, and even strict liability, and whether this
development translates to the other knowledge-level crimes under
examination. In addition, it considers a suggestion to alter radically
the definition of willful blindness, a construct historically and
frequently used to satisfy a knowledge requirement. Also, it delves
into proposals to add an additional mental state of "indifference" to
the taxonomy of criminal mens rea. These ideas not only enlighten
the particular problem raised by Sansregret, but also question the
efficacy of our traditional conceptions of mental states in defining the
proper parameters of criminal responsibility.
The article proceeds in two parts. Part I dissects the opinions in the
Sansregret case in an attempt to understand and explain the confusion
over mental states in the case itself. Interspersed with this explication
is an examination of the meaning of mens rea in rape law and of the
very varied mens rea of rape in common-law countries, particularly in
the United States. I conclude that Sansregret probably did not know
nor was willfully blind to the absence of, or coerced nature of, consent
from his victim, but that he probably should have been guilty of rape
nonetheless.
Part II examines various alternatives that might close this gap
between criminal doctrine and our intuitive moral sensibilities. The
strange case of John Henry Sansregret seems to teach us as much
about the responsibility of a "date rapist,"2 ' or an Enron executive
who professes to have known nothing of the glaring irregularities
surrounding him,2' as it does about the guilt of Sansregret himself. In
the course of this part of the examination, the article delves into
recent scholarship on mental states and on the nature of criminal
culpability generally. This broader discussion covers essentially all
knowledge-level crimes, referring back as well to Sansregret and rape.
20. Cf Dressier, supra note 12, § 33.05, at 587 ("With the expansion of rape law to
include intercourse secured in the absence of grave force or resistance, particularly in
the acquaintance rape context, the issue of mens rea becomes more critical."). For
general discussion of the problem of "date rape," see Schulhofer, supra note 12, Chap.
12: "Dating: What Counts as Consent?," at 254-73; Estrich, supra note 12, at 109, nn.
11-12.
21. See Patty Reinert & Tom Fowler, The Fall of Enron, Houston Chron., Feb. 15,
2002, at Al (recounting Enron employee Sherron Watkins' Congressional testimony
that "Enron's questionable accounting practices were 'common knowledge"' among
senior executives, contradicting testimony of top executive Jeff Skilling, who
professed to believe "the company was in good shape when he resigned"); Rone
Tempest & Richard Simon, The Fall of Enron: Enron's Lay Faces Capitol Hill Hot
Seat Inquiry, L.A. Times, Feb. 3, 2002, at A20 (indicating Congress's interest in
scheduled testimony of Enron CEO Kenneth Lay as to what he knew, because the
public was skeptical that the head of a major corporation, faced with repeated reports
containing warning signals, would not have known of irregularities).
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Part I first considers reducing the mens rea of knowledge to
recklessness, or even negligence, which are easier to prove in many
instances. I conclude that it would be unwise to eliminate the mens
rea of knowledge generally, as was essentially done in the case of
rape. While debatable for some offenses, there are other crimes for
which knowledge remains an appropriate culpable mental state.
Next, Part II explores a suggestion to change the meaning of willful
blindness, often used as a knowledge substitute. The new construct
would cover those, like Sansregret, who "actively" rather than
"deliberately" suppress positive knowledge, as these terms are defined
in the thesis, I conclude that it would be unwise to alter the definition
of willful blindness in an attempt to convict such people. Not only
would this further distort a long established and already problematic
doctrine, but it would prove futile in its effort to implicate Sansregret,
and could actually result in exculpating more seemingly guilty people
than it inculpates.
The final section of Part II discusses a proposal to add an entirely
new mens rea, "indifference," that could well indict the kinds of
offenders in question. I argue that any attempt to fashion an
essentially new mens rea to cover bad acts by people who lack the
traditional required guilty mind must be considered with an
exceptional degree of caution, and any suggestions for a new culpable
mental state should be crafted in an exceedingly careful manner. The
indifference proposal evaluated seems to fail this test.
As a result, I reluctantly conclude that it might not be feasible to
find just the right fix for some of these particular bad acts in search of
a mens rea. Every time one plugs a hole in the bucket, it appears only
to spring more leaks elsewhere. Rectifying this particular wrong
seems to create the potential for more injustice than it resolves.
I. THE PUZZLING MENS REA OF RAPE
A. What Is Meant by the Mens Rea of Rape
In order to understand the Sansregret case, it might be helpful first
to clarify what exactly was in controversy-the mens rea of rape.
While rape is defined differently in different jurisdictions, it usually
encompasses sexual intercourse without consent accomplished by
force or fear.22  Several relevant mental states may arise in
understanding rape. First, the defendant has a mental attitude about
his act of having intercourse. In Model Penal Code terms, he
purposefully, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently has intercourse.23
22. See Model Penal Code § 213.1 cmit. 1 (1980); Dressier, supra note 12, §
33.01[B], at 570 & n.10; LaFave, supra note 14, § 7.18, at 752-53; David P. Bryden,
Redefining Rape, 3 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 317, 320-21 (2000).
23. See Model Penal Code § 2.02(1) (1962).
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Though one could conceive of them, circumstances in which someone
accused of rape had intercourse other than purposefully are surely
rare, if they exist at all.24 Thus, while a defendant's mental attitude
about his act of having intercourse could be described as part of the
mens rea of rape, it is not a particularly relevant mental state.
The mens rea of rape usually refers instead to the defendant's
mental attitude toward the element of nonconsent.25 Thus, what one
cares about is whether the defendant, who had intercourse without
consent, wanted to have sex without consent, knew he did not have
consent, or was reckless or negligent as to whether he had the
complainant's consent. When I refer to the mens rea of rape, I mean
to refer to whichever of these is required to prove a charge of rape.26
The mental attitude of the victim about the act of intercourse may
also be relevant in rape cases. If consent is established subjectively-
that is, based on the victim's intent to consent-then the victim's state
of mind toward the act of intercourse is something else that needs to
be proved to establish rape.27 This mental state is important, but not
usually referred to as the mens rea of rape.
B. Nonconsent and Coerced Consent
To determine what is the mens rea of rape in a case like Sansregret,
it is necessary to distinguish between an act of intercourse without
24. For example, someone might have intercourse knowingly but not purposefully
if he was aware that he was having sex but it was not necessarily his aim or desire to
do so, perhaps if he was being seduced without caring about the outcome. Such a
person is not usually charged with rape. Examples of reckless or negligent acts of
intercourse seem even more difficult to envision.
25. Part I.B raises the issue of intercourse with coerced consent rather than
nonconsent. Everything that is said here about nonconsent would apply as well to
coerced consent situations.
26. In some jurisdictions, it is arguable that none of these culpable mental states is
required for a rape conviction. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
27. Theoretically one could ask, "Did she intend to consent, did she know she was
consenting, or was she reckless or negligent about consenting?" Because consent is
usually thought of as a subjective state, see LaFave, supra note 14, § 7.21(b), at 784(indicating that the outcome of a rape accusation often turns on "what the woman's
state of mind was at the time of the sex act," which is a fact difficult to resolve after
the fact); Nathan Brett, Sexual Offenses and Consent, 11 Can. J.L. & Jur. 69 (1998);
Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of
the Consent Standard, 62 Yale L.J. 54, 55 (1952), the victim's intent to consent would
create consent, and only her intent to consent would create consent. In other words,
one could conclude that she could not be reckless or negligent about her consent,
because she either affirmatively formed a desire-in her own mind-to consent, in
which case she consented, or she did not form such a desire, in which case she did not
consent. A woman could conceivably be confused, even in her own mind, about
whether she was consenting, and perhaps this could be seen to render her reckless or
negligent about her own consent, but this is a confusing notion. Alternatively, we
could use an objective standard to determine the existence of consent, so that consent
would depend on any observable evidence that could be construed as a grant of
permission for the acts involved. Brett, supra.
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consent (which I have been calling "nonconsent") and an act of
intercourse with consent that was coerced by the use, threat or fear of
force (which I am calling "coerced consent"). In most, if not all,
jurisdictions, either one will suffice as the actus reus of rape.28 Thus,
there are at least two different ways of committing rape. Sansregret
involved the latter.29
There are also two ways of characterizing the consent element to be
proved in the second type of rape, involving coerced consent. One
could view this as a situation in which there was consent, but it was
extorted, forced, or otherwise not freely given.' Or, it could be
viewed as a special subset of the cases in which there was not consent,
because what appeared to be consent was not really genuine under the
circumstances, that is, owing to its extortion.3
On a practical level, why bother to make either of these
distinctions? Does it matter whether there is nonconsent or coerced
consent? And does it matter whether, with regard to coerced consent,
it is genuine consent but tainted by its extortion, or it is not consent
because it was extorted and therefore not genuine? One of the judges
deciding the intermediate appeal in the Sansregret case thought that at
least the first distinction made a crucial difference to the required
mens rea. Unfortunately, his explanation seemed to get a bit lost in a
tangle about the second distinction.
In his Manitoba Court of Appeal decision, Judge Huband argued
that there were two categories of rape: the first, intercourse without
consent; and the second, intercourse with consent "extorted by
threats. 32 He then reasoned that the required mens rea to establish
the first type of rape was "intention or recklessness" with regard to
the absence of consent.33 Thus, one who acted "with indifference to
the possibility of nonconsent" could be reckless and thereby satisfy
the mens rea of this first type of rape.34 In contrast, in the second type
28. See LaFave, supra note 14, § 7.18, at 753 (describing nonconsent as a
traditional element of rape, an element that could be proved by showing physical
resistance or such force or threats as to make resistance unavailing).
29. See Sansregret v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 570, 572, 580 (Can.).
30. See R. v. Sansregret, [1983] 25 Man. R.2d 123, 128 (Can.) (Huband, J.,
concurring).
31. See id. at 129 (describing the common-law view).
32. Id. at 128 (Huband, J., concurring). In Judge Huband's words, "Where a male
person has sexual intercourse with a female person who is not his wife, without her
consent, he commits rape. Where the sexual act is with consent, but the consent is
extorted by threats or fear of bodily harm, the crime of rape is also committed, but in
an entirely different way. We are here dealing with a case ... [in] the second
category; consent extorted by threats." Id. At the time Sansregret was decided, the
first type of rape was covered by Canadian Criminal Code § 143(a) and the second by
§ 143(b)(i). See Sansregret, 1 S.C.R. at 580-81.
33. Sansregret, 25 Man. R.2d at 128 (Huband, J., concurring) (citing Pappajohn v.
The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120 (Can.)).
34. Id. at 129 (Huband, J., concurring) (quoting Judge Dickson's dissenting
opinion in Leary v. R., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 29, 35 (Can.)).
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of rape, involving "extorted consent," there is "every indication of
consent," so the significant issue becomes instead whether the accused
"honestly believed that his threats did not induce the consent" or was
"reckless as to whether the consent which was extorted was genuine
or feigned."35 In short, according to Judge Huband, the mens rea of
nonconsensual rape is recklessness as to the fact of nonconsent, while
the mens rea of coerced consent rape is recklessness as to the sincerity
of the consent.36
With one modification, Judge Huband's argument makes sense.
When the nature of the actus reus of rape changes, essentially the
element to be proved changes as well. And when the element to be
proved changes from nonconsent to coerced consent (whether the
latter is characterized as genuine-but-forced or not-genuine-because-
forced), the mens rea attaching to that element can also change.
Therefore, to the extent Judge Huband was maintaining that a
different mens rea might be required to establish the second type of
rape as opposed to the first, he probably was correct. The first type of
rape has as an element nonconsent. Thus, the mens rea to be
established should be, for example, recklessness (if that is the
jurisdiction's choice of mens rea) with regard to whether the
complainant was consenting. The second type of rape has as an
element coerced consent. Thus, the mens rea to be established should
be, using the analogous example, recklessness (again, if that is the
jurisdiction's choice of culpable mental state) with regard to whether
consent was coerced.
Where Judge Huband's decision becomes somewhat confusing is in
his specific explication of that second required mens rea. Instead of
describing it as recklessness as to whether consent was coerced, he
describes it as recklessness as to the genuineness of the consent.
Arguably, this makes a difference: the former focuses on the
aggressor's actions-what was his mental state with regard to his acts
of coercion-while the latter focuses on the complainant's reaction-
what was the aggressor's mental state with regard to the sincerity of
the victim's consent." It might be more reasonable to expect a
35. Id. at 129-30 (Huband, J., concurring). He then concluded that the very act of
proceeding with sexual intercourse immediately after an extended period of
threatening behavior constituted recklessness with regard to whether consent was
extorted. Id. at 130 (Huband, J., concurring).
36. Judge Huband described the latter as "not caring whether the consent be real
or otherwise." Id. (Huband, J., concurring).
37. The former focuses on the defendant's acts of coercion only if it is the
defendant who is doing the coercing. Some rape statutes are drafted seemingly to
inculpate only when it is the defendant who has done the coercing. Presumably this
will usually be the case, though it is possible that the victim could be coerced into sex
with the defendant through acts of someone other than the defendant, or where the
coercion comes from some other source. If these latter scenarios occur, the defendant
would be expected to perceive something about a third party's behavior or some other
existent state of affairs, rather than about the victim's state of mind; the first two still
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defendant to discern something about his own behavior (whether he
has acted in such a fashion as to have coerced consent) than to expect
him to perceive something about someone else's state of mind
(whether the complainant's apparent consent was sincere).
Ultimately, however, the evidence used to establish the coercion of
the consent and the resulting insincerity of the consent is probably at
least overlapping, if not identical. It should usually boil down to what
the defendant said and did and what the complainant said and did, no
matter which of these is the ultimate issue to be proved. Moreover,
when the first type of rape (nonconsensual) is at issue, we expect the
accused to have perceived whether the complainant was consenting;
this, too, is an expectation that similarly focuses on assessing another
person's state of mind.35
Perhaps Judge Huband described the mens rea inquiry as he did
because he was introducing the second distinction mentioned earlier,
between the two different ways to characterize coerced consent rape.
If we look at this type of rape as involving a case in which there was
genuine consent but it was tainted by its extortion, then the element to
be proved is the extortion of the consent, not the sincerity. Since it is
conceded that there was true consent, sincerity seems irrelevant.
Consequently, the mens rea that would attach would be recklessness
as to the extortion of the consent, not as to its sincerity, contrary to
what Judge Huband said.
On the other hand, if we look at this type of rape as involving a
situation in which there really was no consent because it was extorted
and therefore not genuine, then the element to be proved would seem
to have several parts: that the seeming consent was extorted, that the
seeming consent was not genuine because of this extortion, and,
therefore, that there was no consent. Although this indicates three
aspects to the consent element, the latter two of them-the insincerity
of consent and, therefore, the absence of true consent-are essentially
conclusions that stem from the prerequisite fact of the first aspect-
extortion. Thus, the crucial element to be proved is still the extortion,
with the insincerity and then absence of consent necessarily following
once extortion is established. Consequently, the mens rea that would
attach would probably still be recklessness as to the fact of the
extortion, but perhaps also recklessness as to the effects of the
extortion (insincerity of and absence of true consent).
Judge Huband seemed to focus on the effect of the extortion, which
relates to the second characterization of coerced consent, when he
described the required mens rea as going to the issue of the
seem to be more readily discernable details than the third, as they might be more
likely to have objectively observable manifestations.
38. One could question the wisdom of this requirement as well. See, e.g., Brett,
supra note 27 (arguing for an objective rather than subjective determination of
consent).
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genuineness or insincerity of the consent. But, as just explained, the
fact of the extortion should still be a significant element to be proved
in coerced consent rape no matter which characterization is adopted.
Therefore, contrary to Judge Huband's delineation, a mens rea
attaching to the fact of extortion would also seem to be required no
matter which characterization of coerced consent is adopted.
To return to the larger point, there is a difference between
nonconsensual rape and coerced consent rape, and that difference
logically should lead to a difference in how one conceives the required
mens rea element. The next several sections discuss what level of
mens rea seems to be required in various jurisdictions. Whichever
level is required, it then must be attached either to the nonconsent or
coerced consent element, depending on which type of rape is under
consideration in any given case. And if it is coerced consent that is at
issue, no matter how coerced consent is conceptualized, that mens rea
should attach at least to the fact of coercion, whether or not it also
attaches to the sincerity of any apparent trappings of consent that
followed the coercion.
C. The Morass of Mens Rea in American Rape Law
To understand exactly what ought to have been proved to establish
guilt in Sansregret and any similar case, I wondered what culpable
mental state with regard to nonconsent must be proved to convict
someone of rape, particularly in the United States. When I first
considered this question, I thought the answer would be
straightforward, though it might differ from one jurisdiction to
another.39 It was not. Quite apart from the task of examining fifty
different states' laws, the task of resolving the ambiguities within these
laws proved daunting.'
For example, some state statutes define rape with a nonconsent or
coerced consent requirement, either expressly or by implication, but
with no specification of culpable mental state in the statute.4' In these
39. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 213.1 cmt. 1 (1980) ("Older statutes dealing with
[the] range of misconduct [constituting rape] have varied widely in the detail with
which they have described the offensive acts."); Dressier, supra note 12, § 33.01[BI, at
569 & n.7 ("American rape statutes vary considerably in their language.").
40. See Dana Berliner, Rethinking the Reasonable Belief Defense to Rape, 100
Yale L.J. 2687, 2691 (1991) ("Only a few jurisdictions indicate which level of intent
suffices for a rape conviction. Most states simply fail to discuss levels of intent in rape
cases."); Bryden, supra note 22, at 325 ("[T]he law on the mens rea for rape is
muddled.").
41. See Alaska Stat. § 11.41.410(a)(1) (2001) (specifying a nonconsent element);
Cal. Penal Code § 261(a)(2) (2001) (defining rape as an act of sexual intercourse
"against a person's will"); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-70(a)(1) (2001) (defining sexual
assault as "compel[ling] another person to engage in sexual intercourse" by the use or
threat of force); Fla. Stat. ch. 794.011 (2000); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-1(a)(1) (2000)
(defining rape as carnal knowledge of a female "against her will"); Idaho Code § 18-
6101(3)-(4) (2000) (defining rape as sexual penetration where a female resists or is
[Vol. 71
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jurisdictions, case law may or may not clearly supply the missing
required mens rea for the nonconsent element.42
prevented from resisting); Iowa Code § 709.1 (1) (2001) (defining sexual abuse as any
sex act that is done by force or against the will of the victim); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-
3502(a) (2000) (specifying a nonconsent element); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 510.020
(2001) (providing that nonconsent is an element of every sexual act in this chapter), §
510.040 (2001) (defining the sexual act of rape); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:42.1 (2000)
(specifying nonconsent element); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 253 (1)(A), (2)(B)
(2000) (defining gross sexual assault to include sexual acts involving compulsion); Md.
Ann. Code art. 27, § 462 (2001) (specifying a nonconsent element); Mass. Ann. Laws
ch. 265, § 22 (Law. Co-op. 2001) (defining rape as sexual intercourse by force and
against the victim's will); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-95 (2001) (specifying a nonconsent
element); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-319(1) (Michie 2001) (specifying nonconsent
element); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §200.366 (Michie 2001) (defining sexual assault as
sexual penetration "against the will of the victim"); N.Y. Penal Law § 130.05
(McKinney 2001-2002) (specifying a nonconsent element); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
27.2(a)(2) (2000) (defining rape as vaginal intercourse by force and "against the will"
of the victim, later explained as connoting nonconsent in State v. Booher, 290 S.E.2d
561, 564 (N.C. 1982)); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-20-03(1)(a) (2000) (defining gross
sexual imposition as a sexual act in which the defendant "compels the victim to
submit"); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402(1) (2001) (specifying a nonconsent element);
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 3252(a)(1)(A) (2001) (specifying nonconsent element); Va.
Code Ann. § 18.2-61 (Michie 2001) (defining rape as sexual intercourse "against the
complaining witness's will"); W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-8B-2 (Michie 2001) (indicating
that all sexual offenses include a nonconsent element); Wis. Stat. § 940.225 (2000)
(specifying a nonconsent element). In a rare exercise in clarity, Tennessee's rape
statute specifies a nonconsent element and also explicitly includes an accompanying
mental state. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-503(a)(2) (2001) (defining rape as sexual
penetration "accomplished without the consent of the victim and the defendant
knows or has reason to know at the time of the penetration that the victim did not
consent"). Similarly, in North Dakota, the sexual assault statute specifies that sexual
contact is illegal if the defendant "knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the
contact is offensive to the other person." N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-20-07(1)(a) (2000).
42. For states in which case law supplies the otherwise unspecified mens rea, or
specifies that none is required, see, for example, Reynolds v. State, 664 P.2d 621, 625
(Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (holding that mens rea of recklessness applies to the
"surrounding circumstance" element of nonconsent); People v. Williams, 841 P.2d
961, 968-69 (Cal. 1992) (holding that a minimum mens rea of recklessness applies to
the element of nonconsent); State v. Smith, 554 A.2d 713, 715-17 (Conn. 1989)
(holding that sexual assault does not require a specific intent with regard to the
element of nonconsent); Buford v. State, 492 So. 2d 355, 359 (Fla. 1986) (holding that
sexual battery is not a specific intent crime); Williams v. Kemp, 338 S.E.2d 669, 672
n.1 (Ga. 1986) (indicating that sexual assault is not a specific intent crime); Lamar v.
State, 254 S.E.2d 353, 355-56 (Ga. 1979) (implying no mens rea is necessary as to
nonconsent because force "negates any possible mistake as to consent"); State v.
Lopez, 892 P.2d 898, 901 (Idaho 1995) (ruling that rape performed by overcoming the
victim's resistance is not a specific intent crime); State v. Donelson, 302 N.W.2d 125,
136 (Iowa 1981) (holding that sexual abuse does not require a specific intent); State v.
Lile, 699 P.2d 456, 458 (Kan. 1985) (holding that, beyond the general intent to commit
the prohibited act, no specific intent on the defendant's part is required to commit
rape); State v. Reed, 479 A.2d 1291, 1296 (Me. 1984) (holding. that "rape compelled by
force or threat requires no culpable state of mind"); Commonwealth v. Grant, 464
N.E.2d 33, 35-36 (Mass. 1984) (holding that specific intent that intercourse be without
consent is not an element of rape); Roberson v. State, 501 So. 2d 398, 401 (Miss. 1987)
(holding that no mens rea is necessary with regard to nonconsent); State v. Trackwell,
509 N.W.2d 638, 645 (Neb. 1994) ("Intent is not an element of first degree sexual
assault .. "); People v. Williams, 614 N.E.2d 730, 736-37 (N.Y. 1993) (holding that
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Other rape statutes specify a culpable mental state in conjunction
with the act of intercourse, but do not include any mental state
specifically with regard to an express or implied nonconsent element. 3
Such a statute, for example, might provide that one who "knowingly
has intercourse without the complainant's consent" is guilty of rape. 4
In these jurisdictions, the specified mens rea might or might not carry
over to the element of nonconsent 5 Case law may or may not clarify
the matter. 6
lack of consent results from forcible compulsion, for which there is a required mens
rea of intent to forcibly compel another to engage in intercourse or sodomy); Clifton
v. Commonwealth, 468 S.E.2d 155, 158 & n.1 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (ruling that "the
defendant's state of mind regarding the issue of consent is not an element the
Commonwealth is required to prove"). Case law in some jurisdictions, such as
Louisiana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Vermont, and West Virginia, does not appear
to clarify whether a mens rea applies to the nonconsent element when the statute is
silent on the matter. See Malone v. Commonwealth, 636 S.W.2d 647 (Ky. 1982)
(indicating that knowledge or intent are not required, but not specifying exactly what
mental state, if any, is required); State v. Fletcher, 341 So. 2d 340, 343 (La. 1976)
(implying that some mens rea might attach to the nonconsent element by entertaining
a defense of mistake of fact as to consent); Stebbing v. State, 473 A.2d 903, 910 (Md.
1984) (referring to a state prosecutor's assertion that "rape is a general intent crime");
Winnerford v. State, 915 P.2d 291, 294 (Nev. 1996) (stating only that sexual assault is a
general intent crime, without specifying whether that refers to the nonconsent
element); State v. Cummins, 347 N.W.2d 571, 572 (N.D. 1984) (stating that willfully is
the required culpability for gross sexual imposition, which is a general intent crime,
but not clarifying whether that mental state applies to the compulsion (and therefore
nonconsent) element); State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah 1987) (holding that
the mens rea of rape is intent, knowledge, or recklessness, but not specifying whether
this refers to the nonconsent element).
43. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1406 (2000) ("intentionally or knowingly engaging in
sexual intercourse... without consent"); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-402 (2000)
("knowingly inflicts sexual intrusion ... against the victim's will"); Del. Code Ann. tit.
11, § 773(a) (2000) ("intentionally engages in sexual intercourse.., without the
victim's consent"); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-731(1)(a) (1993) ("knowingly subjects
another person to an act of sexual penetration by compulsion"); id. § 707-700
("'Compulsion' means absence of consent..."); Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(a)(1) (2001)
("knowingly or intentionally has sexual intercourse ... when.., the other person is
compelled by force or imminent threat of force"); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-502 (2000)
("knowingly subjects another person to any sexual contact without consent"); Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 22.011(a)(1)(A) (Vernon 2002) (defining sexual assault as
"intentionally or knowingly... caus[ing] the penetration of the ... sexual organ of
another person ... without that person's consent").
44. See supra note 43.
45. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-202 (2001) (indicating that a generally
prescribed mental state applies to each element of an offense unless a contrary
legislative purpose is plain); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 252 (2001) (indicating that,
absent a contrary legislative purpose, the prescribed general mental state applies to all
elements of the offense); Ind. Code. § 35-41-2-2(d) (1998) (indicating that a required
culpability applies to every material element of an offense unless the statute provides
otherwise); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-2-103(4) (2000) (indicating that a generally
prescribed mental state applies to each element of an offense). In some states, such as
Texas, statutes do not indicate whether the specified mens rea is to be applied to the
nonconsent element. See, e.g., Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.02 (Vernon 1994).
46. Compare State v. Witwer, 856 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (ruling
that § 13-202 applies to the sexual abuse statute §13-1404, so that the mens rea of
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In yet other jurisdictions, rape is so defined that consent does not
appear to be an element.47 Even under these statutes, however, it is
possible that consent becomes relevant nonetheless, and therefore
that the mens rea with respect to consent is still in issue."8 This could
occur if the act element is interpreted essentially to require proof of
nonconsent. For example, a statute that defined rape as intercourse
by forcible compulsion could be read to require evidence of
nonconsent in order to establish the necessary force or compulsion.49
knowingly applies to the element that the defendant's sexual contact be without
consent), and State v. Adams, 880 P.2d 226, 234 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that
mens rea of knowingly carries over to the element of nonconsent), with Dunton v.
People, 898 P.2d 571, 573 (Colo. 1995) (holding that no mens rea attaches to the
nonconsent element because the prohibited acts cause the victim to be unable to
consent). In Delaware, the nonconsent element is defined so that the defendant must
somehow compel the victim to submit, and she must resist "to the extent that it is
reasonably necessary to make the victim's refusal to consent known to the
defendant." Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 761(h)(1) (2001). In Texas, case law does not
seem to clarify whether the specified mens rea applies to the nonconsent element.
47. See Ala. Code § 13A-6-61 (2000); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-103 (Michie 2000);
D.C. Code Ann. § 22-4102 (2000); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12-13 (2001); Minn.
Stat. 88 609.342 (2000), 609.343 (2001), 609.344 (2001); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.030
(2000); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 632-A:2 (2000); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-2 (West 2001);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-11 (Michie 2000) (as exemplified by State v. Jiminez, 556 P.2d
60, 63 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976) (absence of consent is not an element of the new crime
that replaced the old rape statute)); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.03 (Anderson 2001);
Okla. Stat., tit. 21, § 1111 (2000); Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.375 (1999); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
3121 (2000); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-2 (2001); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-652 (Law. Co-op.
2000); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-22-1 (Michie 2001); Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.040
(2001); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302 (Michie 2001); cf. LaFave, supra note 14, § 7.20, at
772 ("Contemporary statutes in virtually all jurisdictions either list absence of consent
as one of the elements of the crime or else indicate that consent is a defense.").
48. See Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 953, 1000-01 (explaining that, in states that omit nonconsent and define rape
only to include force, consent is a defense under case law, and, in any event, courts
require both nonconsent and force to establish rape despite different statutory
formulations); see also Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 510.020 (Banks-Baldwin 2001) (stating
that lack of consent is an element of every sexual offense); Mosley v. State, 914
S.W.2d 731, 734 (Ark. 1996) ("The test for determining whether there was force is
whether the act was against the will of the party upon whom the act was
committed."); People v. Thomas, 421 N.E.2d 357, 362 (11. App. Ct. 1981) (holding
that rape requires proof "that intercourse was committed by force and against the will
of the female"); Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 A.2d 765, 768 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)
("The force necessary to support convictions for rape ... need only be such as to
establish lack of consent...").
49. See Model Penal Code § 213.1 cmt. 4 (1980) ("Compulsion plainly implies
non-consent .... "); Dressier, supra note 12, §33.04[B][1][a], at 577 ("Typically, the
elements of nonconsent and force merge."); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes of
Indifference, 49 Rutgers L. Rev. 105, 164 (1996) ("[A]lthough treated in rape law as
an independent element, force often operates as a proxy for awareness of
nonconsent."); see also Inge v. Commonwealth, No. 1628-98-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS
457, at *8 (Va. Ct. App. June 20, 2000) ("To determine whether the element of force
has been proved in the crime[] of non-statutory rape. .. the inquiry is whether the act
or acts were effected with or without the victim's consent."). Cf. Alan Wertheimer,
What Is Consent? And Is It Important?, 3 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 557, 558-59 (2000)
(arguing that force and nonconsent are so intertwined in practice that, even when
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Finally, some jurisdictions delineate a mens rea with regard to
nonconsent, either statutorily or through case law, but then have a
separate rule allowing for a mistake of fact "defense."5 This is
nonconsent is the defining criterion of rape, it will often be difficult to prove
nonconsent beyond a reasonable doubt absent evidence of force by the perpetrator or
resistance by the victim). But see Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520b (2001) (defining
sexual assault as forced or coerced sexual penetration that causes injury) (as
interpreted in State v. Stull, 338 N.W.2d 403, 406-07 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (holding
that nonconsent is not an element of rape, even though the statute requires force or
coercion and consent may be evidence of lack of force or coercion)); Donald A.
Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of Force and
the Absence of Consent, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1780, 1785-92 (1992) (maintaining that
force and nonconsent are separate and distinct elements).
50. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 11.81.620 (Michie 2001) (as exemplified in Reynolds v.
State, 664 P.2d 621, 624 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) ("It is a defense to a charge of forcible
rape that the defendant entertained a reasonable and good faith belief that the female
person voluntarily consented to engage in sexual intercourse.")); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-
204(A)(1) (2000) ("Ignorance or a mistaken belief as to a matter of fact does not
relieve a person of criminal liability unless ... [i]t negates the culpable mental state
required for commission of the offense .. ") (as exemplified in People v. Williams,
841 P.2d 961, 965 (Cal. 1992) ("[A] defendant's reasonable and good faith mistake of
fact regarding a person's consent to sexual intercourse is a defense to rape.")); Del.
Code Ann. tit. 11, § 441(1) (2001) ("[I]t is a defense that the accused engaged in the
conduct charged ... under ignorance or mistake of fact if ... [t]he ignorance or
mistake negatives the state of mind for the commission of the offense .... ); Haw.
Rev. Stat. § 702-218 (2000) (as exemplified in State v. Adams, 880 P.2d 226, 235 (Haw.
Ct. App. 1994) (implying that a defendant's reasonable belief in consent could be a
defense to rape)); Ind. Code § 35-41-3-7 (2000) ("It is a defense that the person who
engaged in the prohibited conduct was reasonably mistaken about a matter of fact, if
the mistake negates the culpability required for commission of the offense.") (as
exemplified in Potter v. State, 684 N.E.2d 1127, 1135 (Ind. 1997)); Tenn. Code Ann. §
39-11-502 (2001) ("[I]gnorance or mistake of fact is a defense to prosecution if such
ignorance or mistake negates the culpable mental state of the charged offense."). But
see, e.g., State v. Christensen, 414 N.W.2d 843, 846 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987) ("'Sexual
abuse [does not] require a specific intent' . . . [so] that a defendant's knowledge of his
or her partner's lack of consent is not an element ... [and so] mistake of fact as to that
consent would not negate an element of the offense."). Louisiana includes a consent
element for forcible and aggravated rapes, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:42, 14:42.1 (West
2000), and does not clarify whether a mens rea attaches to this element, but seems to
recognize the possibility that the state's mistake of fact rule, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
14:16 (West 2000), could apply at least to aggravated rape. See State v. Fletcher, 341
So. 2d 340, 343 (La. 1976) (ruling that the jury could conclude on the facts that "the
defendant was not justified by any 'reasonable ignorance of fact or mistake of fact' ...
to conclude that the victim consented to the act").
"Defense" is in quotation marks in the text because, technically, a mistake of
fact is not really a defense to an otherwise illegal act, but rather negates the mens rea
required for commission of the crime in the first instance. See Pappajohn v. The
Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120, 148 (Can.) (Dickson, J., dissenting) ("Mistake of fact is
more accurately seen as a negation of guilty intention than as the affirmation of a
positive defence.... Mistake is a defence though, in the sense that it is raised as an
issue by an accused. The [prosecutor] is rarely possessed of knowledge of the
subjective factors which may have caused an accused to entertain a belief in a
fallacious set of facts."); Dressier, supra note 12, § 12.02, at 152-53 (explaining that a
mistake of fact is really only a failure of proof of the mens rea element of the crime,
characterized as a "defense" because "the defendant may be required to produce
evidence that he was mistaken," even though the prosecution retains the burden of
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particularly relevant in the kinds of rape discussed in this article and
was relevant in Sansregret itself. When Sansregret's ex-girlfriend said
she had not consented to intercourse, his predictable response was
that he thought she had consented, that is, he made a mistake about
the fact of her nonconsent 1 A mistake of fact is not supposed to
exonerate unless it negates the mens rea required for commission of
the crime charged.52 Nevertheless, in some jurisdictions it appears
that application of the governing mistake rule alters the otherwise
required mens rea.5 3 This appeared to be so in the interpretation of
Canadian rape law by some of the judges in the Sansregret case. 4 In
these jurisdictions, the mens rea required to prove rape in cases in
which the defendant alleges a mistake regarding consent would
ultimately seem to be something other than that delineated in the
state's rape law. Exactly what it would be will depend on the
particular mens rea and mistake rules."
persuading the fact-finder that the defendant was not mistaken and therefore
possessed the requisite mens rea). One exception to the notion that mistake
regarding consent is not really a defense is found in Illinois. There, criminal sexual
assault is defined without a nonconsent element, 720 11. Comp. Stat. 5/12-13 (2001),
so that the state's general mistake rule, 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/4-8 (2001) (making
mistake of fact a defense if it negates a mental state prescribed by statute with respect
to an element of the offense), would not apply. However, consent is expressly made a
defense to criminal sexual assault by operation of a different statute. 720 Ill. Comp.
Stat. 5/12-17 (2001) (making consent a defense to § 5/12-13 "where force or threat of
force is an element of the offense").
51. See R. v. Sansregret, [1983] 22 Man. R.2d 115, 119 (Can.) ("The accused says
that ... notwithstanding that he held a knife while they talked, notwithstanding that
he did most of the talking and that the complainant's answers were clearly equivocal,
he presumed and believed that everything between them was peachy.").
52. See Dressier, supra note 12, § 12.02, at 152-53; LaFave, supra note 14, § 5.1, at
432 ("Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if it negatives a
mental state required to establish a material element of the crime .... ").
53. See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-4-1 (2000) (providing that rape is "knowingly
or intentionally" having intercourse with someone who is being "compelled by force
or imminent threat of force"); id. § 35-41-2-2 (2000) (providing that the specified
culpability applies to every material element of an offense); Potter, 684 N.E.2d at 1135
(holding that mistake of fact is a defense to a rape charge only if the mistake is
"honest and reasonable"); Adams, 880 P.2d at 234-35 (holding that sexual assault
requires proof that the defendant knew he did not have consent, but also implying
that it might be a defense if the defendant "reasonably believe[d] that he had ...
consent"). In these two jurisdictions, the mistake rule appears to lower the mens rea
from knowledge, as stated in the otherwise applicable statutes, to recklessness.
54. See Sansregret v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 570, 581 (Can.) (describing
minimum mens rea for rape as recklessness, but indicating that an honest though
unreasonable mistake would negate that mens rea); R. v. Sansregret, [1983] 25 Man.
R.2d 123, 128-30 (Can.) (Huband, J., concurring); id. at 130-36 (Philp, J., dissenting).
In contrast to the jurisdictions cited in the previous footnote, this application of the
mistake rule appears to heighten rather than lower the mens rea, in this case from
recklessness (as stated by the judges) to knowledge.
55. To add to the confusion, many courts in jurisdictions employing a mistake
defense have recently superimposed a "rule of equivocality" as a threshold for
admitting evidence of mistake. Pursuant to these rules, the defendant may not argue
mistake unless the evidence of consent was equivocal rather than simply disputed.
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For example, in some jurisdictions a reasonable mistake of fact may
qualify as a defense.5" Suppose a rape defendant in such a jurisdiction
makes an unreasonable mistake about nonconsent. Suppose further
that the rape law in this jurisdiction requires knowledge of nonconsent
for a rape conviction. The defendant might not have had the required
mens rea with regard to consent. His honest, though unreasonable,
mistake negates "knowledge" of nonconsent because he mistakenly
thought his partner was consenting and so did not have knowledge of
her nonconsent. If the mistake rule applies nonetheless, and
supercedes the otherwise applicable mens rea requirement in the rape
law, he may be found not to have a mistake defense and to be guilty,
even though the rape statute would otherwise seem to require
knowledge of nonconsent 7 In this case, the mistake rule would
operate to reduce the otherwise required mens rea.
Conversely, in both Sansregret appeals, Court of Appeal Judges
Huband and Philp and Supreme Court Judge McIntyre (writing for a
unanimous court) indicate that recklessness is the mens rea with
regard to nonconsent or coerced consent, but then apply the honest-
mistake-is-a-defense rule.5" If an honest mistake about consent is a
defense, knowledge of nonconsent or coerced consent is effectively
the required mens rea for the commission of rape, not recklessness as
to consent. 9 In this case, the mistake rule operates to raise the
otherwise required mens rea.
See, e.g., Williams, 841 P.2d at 965 (explaining that a mistake defense to rape has an
evidentiary threshold, for which "a defendant must adduce [substantial] evidence of
the victim's equivocal conduct on the basis of which he erroneously believed there
was consent"); see generally Rosanna Cavallaro, A Big Mistake: Eroding the Defense
of Mistake of Fact About Consent in Rape, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 815 (1996).
But see Williams, 841 P.2d at 971 (Mosk, J., concurring) (arguing that, logically,
evidence of equivocal conduct is sufficient but not necessary for the mistake-of-fact-
regarding-consent defense to apply to rape). Presumably, in these jurisdictions, the
normally applicable mens rea rule would apply, and any incongruent mistake rule
could potentially alter the otherwise applicable mens rea only if and when the
threshold showing of equivocality were met. At least in theory, this would mean that
the "ultimate" mens rea standard for rape-that is, the level of mens rea sufficient for
conviction after applying both the rape statute and any applicable mistake rule-
could change from case to case, depending on the facts.
56. See, e.g., 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 304(1) (2001) ("Ignorance or mistake as to a
matter of fact, for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse, is a defense if [it]
negatives the intent, knowledge, belief, recklessness, or negligence required to
establish a material element of the offense."); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.02(a)
(Vernon 2002) ("It is a defense to prosecution that the actor through mistake formed
a reasonable belief about a matter of fact if his mistaken belief negated the kind of
culpability required for commission of the offense.").
57. See supra note 53.
58. See supra note 54.
59. This is explained more fully infra Part I.D.2.
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D. The Mens Rea Required to Establish Rape
1. Generally
After wading through the morass, it appears that the various
American jurisdictions require different mens rea to prove rape.6" At
one time, including when Sansregret was decided, it was the law in
Great Britain, Canada, and other common law jurisdictions that a
defendant must know he does not have consent, or must know that he
has coerced consent, to be guilty of rape.61  Apparently, this is no
longer the case in most common law jurisdictions, 62 but it is still the
rule in a few United States jurisdictions.63 In one state, it seems that
the defendant must have a purpose to have nonconsensual sex in
order to commit rape.64 In other states, recklessness about nonconsent
60. Although I have attempted to chart the required mens rea in each state, some
of the rules in the jurisdictions cited in the footnotes that follow in this section are
sufficiently ambiguous that they could easily be argued to fit into different categories
than those designated.
61. See, e.g., Sansregret v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 570 (Can.); Dir. of Pub.
Prosecutions v. Morgan, 1976 A.C. 182 (H.L. 1975) (Eng.) (appeal taken from C.A.).
But see Simon Gardner, Reckless and Inconsiderate Rape, 1991 Crim. L. Rev. 172
(1991) (arguing that the Morgan case did not really impose a true knowledge
standard, but rather also allowed for conviction if the defendant did not care whether
or not he had consent; further noting that the supposed statutory embodiment of
Morgan, although not correctly followed in subsequent cases, allowed for conviction
for reckless rape).
62. See, e.g., Confronting Sexual Assault, supra note 11, at 11, 352-53 (describing
and quoting 1992 legislative amendments to the sexual offenses laws in Canada in
which the rule for mistake of fact regarding consent is changed and the mens rea of
rape is effectively lowered at least to recklessness).
63. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-202(A) (2001) (indicating that a generally prescribed
culpable mental state applies to each element of an offense unless a contrary purpose
is plain); id. § 13-1406(A) (2000) (defining sexual assault as "intentionally or
knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse... with any person without consent of such
person") (as exemplified in State v. Witwer, 856 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993)
(finding that a mens rea of knowledge applies to the comparable nonconsent element
in the sexual abuse statute)); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-730(1)(a) (2000) (defining first
degree sexual assault as "knowingly" subjecting another to sexual penetration by
strong compulsion); id. § 707-731(1)(a) (defining second degree sexual assault as
"knowingly" subjecting another to sexual penetration by compulsion, as exemplified
in State v. Adams, 880 P.2d 226,234 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that second degree
sexual assault requires "that the defendant knew that he or she did not have the
consent of the alleged victim to engage in the act of penetration")); Mont. Code Ann.
§ 45-2-103(4) (2000) ("If the statute... prescribes a particular mental state with
respect to the offense as a whole without distinguishing among the elements ... the
prescribed mental state applies to each element"); id. § 45-5-502(1) (2000) ("A person
who knowingly subjects another person to any sexual contact without consent
commits... sexual assault."); see also People v. Williams, 614 N.E.2d 730, 736-37
(N.Y. 1993) (opining that nonconsent is an element of rape, but it results from
forcible compulsion, so that the required proof of "intent to forcibly compel"
intercourse necessarily also establishes that the "defendants believed the victim did
not consent").
64. In Ohio, nonconsent may enter as an element of rape by implication because
2002]
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would seem to suffice.65 Using the Model Penal Code's formulation of
recklessness, which largely comports with common-law
understandings, this means the defendant must be shown to have
consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
complainant was not consenting when he proceeded to have
intercourse with her.66 In other American jurisdictions, negligence
with regard to consent appears to be the current standard.67 And, in a
the statute includes "purposely compel[ling an]other person to submit [to sexual
conduct] by force or threat of force." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.02(A)(2)
(Anderson 2001). If compulsion implies nonconsent, then nonconsent would appear
to be an element. Case law confirms that "purposely" is the mens rea that attaches to
the element of compulsion. State v. Wilkins, 415 N.E.2d 303, 306-07 (Ohio 1980).
Thus, it is possible that one must have a purpose to have nonconsensual intercourse.
65. See Reynolds v. State, 664 P.2d 621, 625 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) ("[T]he state
must prove that the defendant acted 'recklessly' regarding his putative victim's lack of
consent."); People v. Williams, 841 P.2d 961, 968-69 (Cal. 1992) (Mosk, J., concurring)
(citing People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337, 1345 (Ca. 1975) for the proposition that the
minimum mens rea of rape is recklessness, meaning with conscious disregard of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the act is unconsented and forcible); State v.
Mitchell, 558 N.E.2d 559, 567 (Il1. App. Ct. 1990) (ruling that "[c]riminal sexual
assault is a general intent offense in which the mental state of intent, knowledge, or
recklessness is implied"); People v. Witte, 449 N.E.2d 966, 971 n.2 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)
(ruling that rape does not require knowledge of the victim's lack of consent, and
implying that a reasonable belief in consent could be a defense); State v. Oliver, 627
A.2d 144, 151-52 (N.J. 1993) (deducing that the factfinder in a sexual assault case
should determine whether the defendant's asserted belief in consent was actually and
reasonably held). In some of these cases, the analysis or conclusion could
alternatively support a mens rea of negligence as well as recklessness. See, e.g.,
Oliver, 627 A.2d at 144; Bryden, supra note 22, at 325-26 (indicating that negligence is
the effective mens rea when reasonable mistake about consent is a defense).
66. See Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c) (1962); see also Dressier, supra note 12, §
10.04[D][3], at 133 (explaining that common law recklessness has come to mean
acting despite awareness of a substantial and unjustifiable risk); Robin Charlow,
Wilful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1351, 1377-80 (1992)
(exploring the parameters of criminal recklessness); cf. Professor Stephen Schulhofer,
Address at the American Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting, Joint Session
on Criminal Law and Women and the Law: New Perspectives on Sexual Assault (Jan.
6, 2002) [hereinafter AALS Address] (maintaining that the there may not be a
practical difference between reckless and negligent rape, presumably because both
are judged by the same objective evidence of nonconsent).
67. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-503 (2001) (defining rape as sexual penetration
"accomplished without the consent of the victim and the defendant knows or has
reason to know at the time of the penetration that the victim did not consent"
(emphasis added)); State v. Smith, 554 A.2d 713, 717 (Conn. 1989) ("whether a
complainant should be found to have consented depends upon how her behavior
would have been viewed by a reasonable person under the surrounding
circumstances," not on the defendant's awareness or "reckless disregard of her
nonconsenting status"); Russell v. United States, 698 A.2d 1007, 1016 n.12 (D.C.
1997) (holding that in order for a defendant to prove consent he must prove "whether
a reasonable person would think that the complainant's 'words or overt actions
indicate[d] a freely given agreement to the sexual act or contact in question"' (citation
omitted)); State v. Ayer, 612 A.2d 923, 926 (N.H. 1992) ("If ... the victim objectively
communicates lack of consent and the defendant subjectively fails to receive the
message, he is guilty. The appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable person in the
circumstances would have understood that the victim did not consent."); see also Del.
2002] ANATOMY OF A RAPE 281
number of states, courts seem to treat the nonconsent element as one
of strict liability, requiring no mens rea for conviction.68
Several states do not delineate a particular mens rea with regard to
nonconsent either in the relevant statutes or in the case law, nor do
they indicate that none is required.69 In the end, in many, if not most,
Code Ann. tit. 11, § 761(h)(1) (2001) (defining "without consent" so that "the victim
need resist only to the extent that it is reasonably necessary to make the victim's
refusal to consent known to the defendant"); State v. Koperski, 578 N.W.2d 837, 843-
46 (Neb. 1998) (concluding that, under a predecessor statute, "[t]he appropriate
inquiry is whether a reasonable person in the circumstances would have understood
that the victim did not consent"); Bryden, supra note 22, at 325-26 (stating that
negligence is, in effect, the mens rea of rape whenever reasonable mistake about
consent is a defense).
68. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-1 (2001) (defining rape as carnal knowledge
"forcibly and against [the victim's] will," as clarified in Lamar v. State, 254 S.E.2d 353,
356 (Ga. 1979) (ruling that the required force necessarily negates any possibility of
mistake)); Dunton v. People, 898 P.2d 571, 573 n.2 (Colo. 1995) (holding that sexual
assault under a predecessor statute "simply requires the actor's awareness of engaging
in certain prohibited acts which the statute equates to nonconsent," and "the actor
need not be aware of the victim's actual nonconsent"); State v. Christensen, 414
N.W.2d 843, 845-46 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987) (appearing to rule that sex offenses involve
strict liability with regard to consent); State v. Lile, 699 P.2d 456, 458 (Kan. 1985)
(holding that the rape statute is constitutional even though it does not permit a
defendant to argue that he mistakenly perceived he had consent); State v. Reed, 479
A.2d 1291, 1296 (Me. 1984) (holding that "rape compelled by force or threat requires
no culpable state of mind"); Commonwealth v. Lopez, 745 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Mass.
2001) ("[N]o mens rea or knowledge as to the lack of consent has ever been
required."); Commonwealth v. Lefkowitz, 481 N.E.2d 227, 231 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985)
(holding that rape is proved if the jury concludes that intercourse was nonconsensual
[by force or threat of injury], without any special emphasis on the defendant's state of
mind); Roberson v. State, 501 So. 2d 398, 401 (Miss. 1987) (holding that sexual battery
requires only the intent to do the forbidden act and no other mental element is
necessary); Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 A.2d 765, 769 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)
("The crux of the offense of rape is force and lack of victim's consent.... If the
element of the defendant's belief as to the victim's state of mind is to be established as
a defense to the crime of rape then it should be done by our legislature." (citations
omitted)); Clifton v. Commonwealth, 468 S.E.2d 155, 158 (Va. Ct. App. 1996)
(rejecting defendant's contention that some mens rea, even negligence, must be
shown with regard to nonconsent in order to establish rape); State v. Elmore, 771 P.2d
1192, 1193-94 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (ruling that the legislative omission to include
any culpable mental state in conjunction with the statutory element of nonconsent
means no mens rea is required for that element).
69. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-103 (Michie 2001) (defining rape as
intercourse by forcible compulsion, interpreted to mean without consent as in Mosley
v. State, 914 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Ark. 1996), but not indicating whether nonconsent
involves a mens rea); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:42.1 (2000); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, §
462 (2001) (including a nonconsent element with no specified mens rea); N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-27.2 (2000) (defining rape to include vaginal intercourse "against the will"
of the victim, but not expressing an accompanying mens rea); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, §
3252(a)(1) (2001) (defining sexual assault as compelling participation in a sexual act
without consent, with no mens rea mentioned, as exemplified in State v. Gabert, 564
A.2d 1356, 1359 (Vt. 1989) (declining to decide whether sexual assault requires a
mens rea element)); W. Va. Code § 61-8B-2 (2001) (making lack of consent an
element of every sexual offense, but failing to indicate the applicable mens rea, if
any); Wis. Stat. § 940.225 (2000) (requiring nonconsent for sexual assault, but not
indicating any mens rea, as exemplified in Brown v. State, 207 N.W.2d 602, 609 (Wis.
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states, the ultimate rule-that is, the mens rea with regard to consent
sufficient for conviction after applying the rape statute; the local rules
explaining how to apply a generally stated mens rea to each element,
or how to ascertain an unstated mens rea; and the applicable mistake
rule-remains unclear.' Finally, some states simply do not appear to
require, or purport not to require, proof of nonconsent at all,
rendering the mens rea for such an element irrelevant."'
1973) (ruling that rape is not a specific intent crime, but not indicating whether a
lesser, general intent applies to the nonconsent element)).
70. See, e.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-20-03 (defining gross sexual imposition to
include compulsion, with no specified mens rea, as exemplified in State v. Cummins,
347 N.W.2d 571, 572 (N.D. 1984) (indicating, vaguely, that gross sexual imposition is a
crime of general intent, for which the required culpability is "willfully")); Or. Rev.
Stat. § 163.375(1) (1999) (defining rape as sexual intercourse in which the victim "is
subjected to forcible compulsion," without indication of mens rea); Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 22.011 (Vernon 2000) (defining sexual assault as intentionally or knowingly
causing sexual penetration without consent); Anonymous v. State, 507 So. 2d 972, 975
(Ala. 1987) (stating that first degree rape "does not require any specific criminal
intent"); Askew v. State, 118 So. 2d 219, 222 (Fla. 1960) (holding that rape is not a
specific intent crime, but not clarifying whether the mens rea of general intent applies
to the element of nonconsent); State v. Lopez, 892 P.2d 898, 901 (Idaho 1995)
(indicating only that forcible rape "is not a specific intent crime"); Potter v. State, 684
N.E.2d 1127,1135 (Ind. 1997) (stating that a statutory mens rea of knowledge applied
to every element of rape, but only a reasonable, honest mistake about consent may be
a valid defense); Malone v. Commonwealth, 636 S.W.2d 647, 647 (Ky. 1982) (opining
that the drafters of the Penal Code did not intend "to inject the elements of intent or
knowledge... into the crimes of forcible rape and sodomy," but not ruling on
whether any other mens rea applied to the elements of nonconsent or forcible
compulsion); State v. Beishir, 646 S.W.2d 74, 78-79 (Mo. 1983) (discussing conflicting
state court opinions and stating in dicta that forcible rape would seem to preclude a
defense of unreasonable mistake); Dinkens v. State, 546 P.2d 228, 229-30 (Nev. 1976)
(indicating that nonconsent is the essence of rape, but not specifying a mens rea);
Winnerford v. State, 915 P.2d 291, 294 (Nev. 1996) (ruling that "[s]exual assault is
generally considered a general intent crime," without clarifying what, if any, mens rea
is required regarding nonconsent); State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah 1987)
(holding that rape may be committed recklessly, but not specifying whether this mens
rea applies only to the act or also to the nonconsent element); State v. Aumick, 869
P.2d 421, 423 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that rape does not require the element
of intent), affd 894 P.2d 1325 (Wash. 1995); Bryan v. State, 745 P.2d 905, 909 (Wyo.
1987) (holding that first degree sexual assault is a general intent crime, but not
indicating whether any mens rea applies to lack of consent).
Note, however, that if some of the jurisdictions just cited follow the general
rule with regard to general intent crimes, a specific intent to have nonconsensual
intercourse would not be required, and a defendant would be guilty of rape if he
possessed some morally blameworthy state of mind regarding nonconsent. See
Dressier, supra note 12, § 33.05, at 586-87 & nn.100-03. But see Bryden, supra note 22,
at 325 (indicating that all that was required at common law when rape was a general
intent crime was an intention to perform the act). Whether this rule results in
classifying the required mens rea as recklessness or negligence is still not clear,
although at least one commentator has argued that, in practice, there is no real
distinction between reckless and negligent rape, see Schulhofer, AALS Address,
supra note 66, and that attempting to distinguish the two obscures the real, and
different, issue of what is meant by consent, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Gender
Question in Criminal Law, 7 Soc. Phil. & Pol. 105,132-33 (1990).
71. See, e.g., Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1111 (2000) (defining rape as sexual intercourse
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2. In Sansregret
Much ink was spilled in the Sansregret case over the mens rea
required for conviction of rape. The trial judge appeared to believe
that the required mens rea for commission of rape was knowledge and
found Sansregret had not committed rape. She reasoned that "[t]here
was no meaningful consent" and that "[t]he apparent consent was
[the] result of threats or fear of bodily harm."72 She found further that
"no rational person could have been under any honest mistake of
fact" about the absence of true consent or "could have believed that
the complainant's dramatic about-face [in first having rejected the
defendant and then agreeing possibly to reconcile and have sex with
him] stemmed from anything other than fear."73 Nevertheless, she
concluded that Sansregret had indeed believed that all was back to
normal between him and the complainant and that he had her
consent.74 "He saw what he wanted to see, heard what he wanted to
hear, believed what he wanted to believe."75 Judge Krindle reached
this conclusion not only owing to the defendant's own testimony, but
mostly because his assertion was supported by the testimony of the
complainant.76 As the Judge explained, the couple had sat on the bed
conversing for about twenty to thirty minutes between the time of his
terrorizing her and the act of intercourse.77 During this period, the
complainant, having resolved to do whatever necessary to calm the
defendant, told him what he wanted to hear, including that she still
cared for him, that they might reconcile, and that there was no other
man in her life.7" When he proposed lovemaking and began to kiss
"[w]here force or violence is used or threatened"); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-2 (2001)
(defining sexual assault as penetration using force or coercion); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-
3-652 (Law Co-op. 2000) (defining criminal sexual conduct as sexual battery using
"aggravated force," which is defined in § 16-3-651 to include such physical force as to
"overcome the victim"); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-22-1 (Michie 2001) (defining rape as
sexual penetration through the use of force, coercion, or threats); State v. Kelly, No.
C5-94-375, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 993, at *2-3 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1994)
(holding that the first-degree criminal sexual conduct statute requires only a general
intent to do the prohibited acts, and does not mention nonconsent); State v. Jiminez,
556 P.2d 60, 63 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976) ("Absence of consent is not an element of the
crime [of rape] as defined by the Legislature," though it was an element of the prior,
repealed statute). Compare State v. Stull, 338 N.W.2d 403, 406 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983)
(ruling that nonconsent is not an element of rape, though evidence of consent may be
offered to show lack of force or coercion), and State v. Hale, 370 N.W.2d 382, 383
(Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (ruling that the standard jury instructions on third degree
criminal sexual conduct implied that the jury must find that the complainant did not
consent to sexual intercourse before finding the defendant guilty).
72. R. v. Sansregret, [1983] 22 Man. R.2d 115, 119 (Can.).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 118.
78. Id.
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her, she put up no resistance. 9 As Judge Krindle concluded, the
complainant "knows him and in her opinion, notwithstanding all the
objective facts to the contrary, he did believe that everything was back
to normal between them by the time of the sexual encounter."8 The
Judge then pointed to dictum in a then-recent case from the Supreme
Court of Canada to opine that such an honest mistake about consent,
whether objectively reasonable or not, would absolve the defendant of
criminal liability for rape, and she invited the prosecution to appeal
the case for guidance as to whether that rule was intended to apply in
this particular situation.81 In short, she reasoned that the applicable
rule was that any honest mistake about consent would exonerate, so
that knowledge of the absence of genuine consent must be the mens
rea required to establish rape.
If the trial judge was wrong and the mens rea required for
commission of rape in Sansregret had been recklessness, there should
have been little difficulty finding that the defendant raped his ex-
girlfriend." Recklessness involves both subjective and objective
components. 3 Subjectively, the defendant must be aware of the risk
that he does not have the victim's consent. Objectively, that risk must
be substantial and disregard of it unjustifiable under the
circumstances. In Sansregret, if the defendant were found to have
been aware of the risk that the victim's consent was coerced, the risk
would surely have been considered substantial and its disregard
unjustifiable. Even though the trial judge, acting as fact-finder,
believed that Sansregret was not actually aware of the victim's
coerced consent, she nevertheless could more readily have concluded
that he was aware of at least the risk that his ex-girlfriend was coerced
into consenting, as well as of factors that rendered that risk substantial
and its disregard unjustifiable." As for the socially normative,
objective component of recklessness, it seems wholly unreasonable for
Sansregret to have concluded that his ex-girlfriend was freely
consenting to intercourse in the face of his outrageous and frightening
79. Id. Sansregret specifically asked the complainant whether she wanted to make
love, to which she responded "with you dressed like that" or "with you like that." He
took this response to mean she was consenting and took off his clothes. He then tried
to perform oral sex on her, which she resisted, so he desisted. She did not resist an act
of intercourse, but when he suggested a second act she said she had to go to work. He
did not insist. Id.
80. Id. at 119.
81. Id. (discussing Pappajohn v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120 (Can.)).
82. Sansregret v. The Queen, (1985] 1 S.C.R. 570, 582 (Can.) ("There was indeed
an abundance of evidence before the trial judge upon which a finding of recklessness
could have been made.").
83. See Charlow, supra note 66, at 1377 and authorities cited therein.
84. This would most likely comprise the subjective portion of reckless disregard.
See id. at 1379-80 n.130. But see Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes of Indifference, 49
Rutgers L. Rev. 105, 120 n.36 (1996) (arguing that a reckless defendant must actually
realize both the great danger of his conduct and its lack of justification).
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behavior. s5 Thus, had it been relevant, the trial judge might have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that Sansregret acted recklessly
with regard to consent.
When the Sansregret case reached the Court of Appeal, the Justices
disagreed over what the Canadian Supreme Court had previously held
was the mens rea for rape. This was because in Pappajohn v. The
Queen, an earlier case involving nonconsensual rape, the Supreme
Court had fragmented on the issue of the defense of mistake of fact. 6
One judge in Pappajohn, Dickson, had said that mistake is a defense
whenever the defendant honestly believes he has consent or at least
does not know he does not have consent.87 The reasonableness of his
belief is only evidence from which to determine whether the belief
was actually held, and is not required for the belief to exonerate.8
Judge Philp, in his dissent in the Court of Appeal decision in
Sansregret, adopted this view and applied it to the second type of rape,
coerced consent rape, that was involved in Sansregret. This position
on the mistake defense seems to assume that knowledge is the
required mens rea for either type of rape. As Judge Philp reasoned,
for a mistake to serve as a defense, it must negate the mens rea of the
crime.89 Even an unreasonable mistake about consent will serve as a
defense to a rape charge, according to the majority of judges in
Pappajohn.° Ergo, there must be a subjective standard of mens rea
regarding consent: as long as the defendant subjectively believes he
has consent, whether reasonably or unreasonably, he has a defense.9
Thus, knowledge of nonconsent or coerced consent-a subjective
state of awareness that there is not consent or that it was coerced-is
the minimum required mens rea for a rape conviction.
A second judge in Pappajohn had agreed with Judge Dickson's
statement of the basic mistake in rape rule, but added that there must
be some evidence giving the belief in consent an air of reality, or else
the mistake defense would not be put before the jury.92 Judge Matas
85. This would comprise the objective portion of reckless disregard. "The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the
actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in
the actor's situation." Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c) (1962).
86. See Pappajohn v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120, 123 (Can.) (opinion of
Judge McIntyre); id. at 134 (opinion of Judge Martland); id. at 137 (opinion of Judge
Dickson); R. v. Sansregret, [1983] 25 Man. R.2d 123,127 (Can).
87. Pappajohn, 2 S.C.R. at 149 (Dickson, J., dissenting); Sansregret, 25 Man. R.2d
at 127, 134.
88. Pappajohn, 2 S.C.R. at 156 (Dickson, J. dissenting); Sansregret, 25 Man. R. 2d
at 127.
89. Sansregret, 25 Man. R.2d at 130-31 (Philp, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 131-32 (Philp, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 131 (Philp, J., dissenting).
92. Pappajohn, 2 S.C.R. at 128 (McIntyre, J.); Sansregret, 25 Man. R.2d 127. For a
discussion of the "air of unreality" standard, see Don Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law
259-62 (3d ed. 1995); Williams, supra note 11, at 617-18.
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in his Manitoba Court of Appeal decision in Sansregret seemed to
adopt this air of unreality standard. He maintained that there was an
air of unreality in allowing Sansregret to claim the mistake defense
because his was a case in which the complainant's successful pretense
that she was consenting stemmed directly from her fear for her life
created by Sansregret himself.93 This "air of unreality" overlay
appears to transform the mens rea required for a rape conviction from
knowledge to recklessness. If the mistake about consent must have an
air of reality about it, it seems it must be something an average person
grounded in reality, presumably just like the judge making the
determination, would deem within the realm of what is reasonable.
While purporting to abjure the reasonableness requirement for a
mistake defense, those judges imposing the air of reality threshold
hurdle to get the defense before the jury seem to have reintroduced
the reasonableness requirement through the back door-or maybe in
this case, since it is a prerequisite, through the front door. If the
defendant's mistake about consent must approach an objectively
reasonable belief in order to have an air of reality about it, and thus
ultimately in order to negate the mens rea of rape, the mens rea of
rape could be something less than a strictly subjective awareness
(knowledge) of nonconsent or of coerced consent. Rather, the mens
rea could also be satisfied by a state of mind that failed an objectively
reasonable measure. Therefore, recklessness about consent would
also suffice for conviction.94
93. Sansregret, 25 Man. R. 2d at 127-28.
94. The view that recklessness would suffice was similarly adopted by Judge
Huband in the Court of Appeal in Sansregret. However, he deduced this by surveying
the relevant case law. Id. at 128-30 (Huband, J., concurring). A third judge in
Pappajohn avoided the mistake issue altogether. He determined that it was
unnecessary to decide whether the mistaken belief in consent need be reasonable in
order to exonerate because the defense was unavailable to the defendant in
Pappajohn in any event.
One complicating factor in establishing the existence of required mental states
that contain subjective elements (e.g., knowledge, recklessness) is the nature of the
proof used to substantiate these elements. See David P. Leonard, The Use of
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence to Prove Knowledge 2 (2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review) (indicating that knowledge must
always be proven circumstantially, raising difficult questions about the types of
evidence that may be used to establish the fact). Subjective mens rea usually must be
proven by inferences drawn from objective evidence, Charlow, supra note 66, at 1359-
60 (specifically addressing knowledge), a problem in many areas of criminal law, but
seemingly exacerbated by the nature of the facts involved and the evidence available
in many rape cases. PappaJohn, 2 S.C.R. at 134-37 (Martland, J., concurring).
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E. Willful Blindness Regarding Consent
1. As Applied in Sansregret v. The Queen
When the Sansregret case reached the Canadian Supreme Court,
that court unanimously concluded that, although knowledge of
nonconsent or coerced consent effectively was required for the
commission of rape,95 the defendant was nonetheless guilty. The
judges opined that Sansregret had willfully blinded himself to the fact
that the complainant's consent was coerced.96 According to a well
established rule in criminal law, when one does not "know" a fact
required for the commission of a crime because he has willfully
blinded himself to awareness of it, the element of knowledge of that
fact is nonetheless satisfied.97 The Supreme Court supported its
conclusion with statements from the trial court's opinion that alluded
to willful ignorance.98 For example, Judge Krindle had said that,
although no rational person could have been operating under an
honest mistake of fact about the reason for the complainant's
submission to intercourse, "people have an uncanny ability to blind
themselves to much that they don't want to see, and to believe in the
existence of facts as they would wish them to be."99 She also noted
that, despite her confidence "in the ability of people to blind
themselves to reality," she would have been hard pressed to credit the
honesty of the defendant's belief about consent had it not been for the
complainant's own testimony supporting his claim."' She concluded
that he "saw what he wanted to see, heard what he wanted to hear,
[and] believed what he wanted to believe. '' ... Finally, she solicited
guidance from the Supreme Court on whether it intended the mistake
rule of Pappajohn to apply to "situations where an accused, who
demonstrates the clarity and shrewdness this accused showed in
securing his own safety at the outset can turn around and because it
does not suit his wishes, can go willfully blind to the obvious, shortly
thereafter.....2 The Supreme Court used these statements to conclude
that Sansregret had acted with willful blindness to the issue of
consent. I explore this ruling more fully,13 but added background
95. 1 say "effectively" because the court purports to apply a recklessness standard,
but then also applies the mistake defense of Pappajohn, thereby raising the required
mens rea to knowledge. See discussion supra at Part I.C, notes 58-59 and
accompanying text; Part I.D.2.
96. Sansregret v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 570, 583, 586-87 (Can.).
97. See Charlow, supra note 66, at 1353-54.
98. Sansregret, I S.C.R. at 583, 586-87.
99. R. v. Sansregret, [1983] 22 Man. R.2d 115,119 (Can.).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See infra notes 114-23; discussion infra Part I.E.2.
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would be helpful first to understand how the Court reached its
conclusion regarding willful ignorance.
To begin its analysis, the Supreme Court agreed with Judge Huband
that, in the case of coerced consent rape, consent "is assumed from
the outset" and the only issue is "whether it was freely given or
procured by threats.' 4 Therefore, also as Judge Huband had ruled,
where the accused asserts an honest belief in consent, the belief must
''encompass more than the fact of consent" and must include "a belief
that it has been freely given and not procured by threats. ' .5 Judge
McIntyre, writing for the Court, concluded that the mens rea for
nonconsensual rape "must involve knowledge that the woman is not
consenting, or recklessness as to whether she is consenting or not,"
and that the mens rea for coerced consent rape is "knowledge that the
consent was given because of threats or fear of bodily harm, or
recklessness as to its nature."'' 6 Hence, in accord with and extending
the rule of Pappajohn, "an honest belief on the part of the accused,
even though unreasonably held, that the woman was consenting to
intercourse freely and voluntarily and not because of threats, would
negate the mens rea [of coerced consent rape] and entitle the accused
to an acquittal.""'7
This conclusion is faulty. If recklessness as to consent (for
nonconsensual rape) or as to the coerced nature of the apparent
consent (for coerced consent rape) is sufficient for conviction, an
honest but unreasonable mistake about either the fact of consent (for
nonconsensual rape) or its nature (for coerced consent rape) would
not necessarily negate the required mens rea and entitle the defendant
to an acquittal. While any honest mistake about consent, even an
unreasonable one, would negate knowledge of nonconsent or coerced
consent, it would not necessarily negate recklessness about consent. If
the accused was aware of the risk of nonconsent or the risk that
consent had been coerced, and he nevertheless made an unreasonable
mistake about the ultimate fact that he did not have consent or that he
had coerced consent, he would have made an honest, unreasonable
mistake and still have been reckless as to consent. In this
circumstance, the defendant could have satisfied both elements of
recklessness: subjectively, he was aware of the risk of questionable
consent; objectively, the risk that he was making a mistake could have
been substantial and unjustifiable, and it most likely was both if his
mistake was unreasonable. Hence, an honest, unreasonable mistake
about consent would negate a mens rea of knowledge, but it certainly
would not necessarily negate a mens rea of recklessness. Thus, by
recognizing the honest though unreasonable mistake as a full defense
104. Sansregret v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 570, 580 (Can.).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 581.
107. Id.
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to either of these forms of rape, the Supreme Court of Canada
effectively transformed the mens rea of rape from recklessness to
knowledge.
Having settled on this relatively higher standard for a finding of
culpability (though not acknowledging it outright), the Court
nonetheless found the defendant guilty on the rape charge. First,
Judge McIntyre defined recklessness in the usual way, as "the conduct
of one who sees the risk and who takes the chance."' 8 Then he noted
that, since we would assume that one "who intimidates and threatens
a woman and thereafter obtains her consent to intercourse would
know that the consent was obtained as a result of the threats,"
recklessness as to the nature of the consent could easily be attributed
to Sansregret, and the case "could have been disposed of on the basis
of recklessness."'0 9 He observed that Judge Krindle did not so dispose
of the case because she applied the mistake rule discussed above,110
pursuant to which a finding of knowledge of coerced consent was
essentially required. Although he noted that Judge Krindle was
correct about the mistake rule as applied generally in rape, he
concluded that it was incorrect to apply the rule given the facts of this
case."' This is because Judge Krindle also found the defendant to
have been "wilfully blind to reality," which would preclude
application of the mistake defense.' According to the Supreme
Court, the defense of honest mistake of fact overrides a finding of
recklessness, but "a finding of wilful blindness as to the very facts
about which the honest belief is now asserted would leave no room for
the application of the defen[s]e." '
When it came to the willful ignorance discussion, this is how the
Court reasoned: The trial judge was wrong to find that she did not
have enough evidence from which to conclude that Sansregret knew
of his ex-girlfriend's earlier complaint of rape."4 Since Judge Krindle
108. Id. at 582.
109. Id. The Court pointed to "an abundance of evidence" from which a finding of
recklessness about consent could have been made, including the complainant's
demonstration of her rejection of the accused when she dismissed him from her house
the month before after a period of cohabitation; the earlier incident of his breaking
into her house and then terrorizing her into consenting to intercourse; her report to
the police about the earlier incident, which led to the involvement of his probation
officer, who persuaded her to drop her earlier complaint; and the incident of October
15, in which he again broke into her house "and repeated his earlier performance."
Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 583.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 584.
114. Id. at 582-83. Judge Krindle had observed that Sansregret knew the
complainant had complained to the police and therefore "had some awareness that
[she] was displeased" with him. R. v. Sansregret, [1983] 22 Man. R.2d 115, 116 (Can.).
However, the judge said she "[did] not know whether anyone told the accused that
[the complainant] complained of the sexual act as being an act of rape." Id. She
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could-and indeed, should-have found that Sansregret knew not
only of the earlier complaint but also that it was a complaint of rape,
the defendant was on notice that the complainant considered a similar
episode to be rape."5 Thus, he was "aware of the likelihood of the
complainant's reaction to his threats," so that, when he proceeded to
have intercourse with her on the present occasion, after having
similarly threatened her, he was engaging in "self-deception to the
point of wilful blindness.""' 6 Willful blindness arises when a person
becomes aware of the need for inquiry but declines to make inquiry
because he does not wish to know the truth. 17 In such cases, the
person is deemed to have knowledge of the fact he has avoided
learning."" Sansregret fit the parameters of one who has been
willfully blind because he had intercourse on the present occasion
despite his knowledge that his partner considered an earlier act of
intercourse under similar circumstances to be rape.' 9  Hence,
Sansregret, willfully blind to the fact that he had coerced his ex-
girlfriend's consent on the present occasion, is presumed to have
knowledge of the coerced nature of her consent. 2 " Because he is
deemed to have knowledge of the fact of coerced consent, he cannot
avail himself of the defense of mistake of fact about this element.'2'
His "honest belief" in genuine consent amounts to nothing more than
"no specific knowledge to the contrary." It cannot serve as a defense
for someone who has deliberately avoided knowing that he does not
have genuine consent.'22  Thus "fixed by law with actual
knowledge[,] ... his belief in another state of facts is irrelevant."' 23
2. As Misapplied in Sansregret v. The Queen?
Did the Court correctly apply the doctrine of willful blindness to
these facts? At the outset, the Court's explanation of its disposition of
concluded that, if there had been any evidence "that the accused was aware on
October 15th that the complainant had considered the sexual relations of September
23rd, 1982 to have been nonconsensual, [she] would have rejected [the mistake]
defence out of hand," but there was "no such evidence." Id.
115. See Sansregret v. The Queen, [19851 1 S.C.R. 570, 582-83 (Can.).
116. Id. at 587. The Court noted that one could not really infer willful blindness
based solely on the events of October 15, 1982, and that Judge Krindle was correct to
have declined to do so. See id. Those events would only establish that Sansregret
should have known the complainant was consenting out of fear, see id., presumably
because a reasonable person in the circumstances would have known. To assume
willful blindness under those circumstances would be to apply essentially a negligence
standard.
117. Id. at 584.
118. Id. at 585-86.
119. See id. at 587.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 587-88.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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the evidentiary issue supporting the finding of willful ignorance is
unconvincing. Judge McIntyre, writing for the Court, ruled that
willful ignorance of the fact that consent was coerced during the
October incident could be inferred because the defendant had been
aware that the similar September incident was reported as a rape.24
Judge McIntyre seems to be implying that the report of rape indicated
that the complainant was in fact not genuinely consenting in
September when she appeared to be agreeing to intercourse after the
defendant had terrorized her. Thus, if the defendant knew of the
report, presumably he was aware that when his ex-girlfriend appears
to acquiesce to sex following his terrorizing behavior there is a very
strong probability that her consent is coerced. Taking this inference
one step further, if, in October, the defendant terrorizes his ex-
girlfriend and then has intercourse with her, knowing that in a prior,
similar situation she considered her consent to have been coerced, he
is being willfully blind to the fact that her consent is coerced at that
later time as well.
There are a couple of issues raised by, as well as a factual problem
with, this analysis. First, imbedded in this reasoning is the assumption
that the complainant's description of the first episode as a rape means
that her consent at that time was indeed coerced. This may be an
appropriate or correct assumption, but we should recognize that it
embodies a subjective standard regarding consent-that is, consent is
coerced if the complainant believes or says it is. While nonconsent
usually is determined according to the complainant's subjective
assessment, this proposition is not uncontroversial.
Second, there is a disconnect between Judge McIntyre's definition
of willful blindness and his application of it on these facts. As the
Judge explains it, "wilful blindness arises where a person who has
become aware of the need for some inquiry declines to make the
inquiry because he does not wish to know the truth. He would prefer
to remain ignorant.' 1 26 In the Judge's words, culpability in willful
blindness "is justified by the accused's fault in deliberately failing to
inquire when he knows there is reason for inquiry.' 1 27 If this is the
operative definition of willful ignorance, it is awkward to apply it to
the Sansregret facts. Inquiry seems a perverse concept to introduce in
this case. What inquiry should Sansregret have made to have
ascertained whether consent was coerced in October? Suppose he
had come right out and asked the complainant whether she was
genuinely consenting to have sex with him despite his preceding
violent behavior. Would she have answered anything other than the
sincerest affirmation she could manage to muster, in order to save her
124. See supra notes 114-23 and accompanying text.
125. See Wertheimer, supra note 49, passim.
126. Sansregret, 1 S.C.R. at 584.
127. Id.
2002]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
life? Suppose he had asked her to sign an affidavit swearing that she
was consenting. Presumably she would have signed it, all the while
assuring him she meant every word. By her own admission, she was
doing her best to make him believe that she cared for him and was
receptive to him. Under those circumstances, no inquiry would suffice
to allay the possibility of feigned consent.
The problem seems to be that willful ignorance is designed for
situations in which inquiry would reveal the truth. One who could
readily ascertain the truth but for deliberately avoiding it is charged
with knowing what he would have known had he not avoided
knowledge. But Sansregret apparently could not have readily
ascertained the truth by inquiring. His failure to comprehend the
reality about consent seems to stem from something other than his
turning his back on what would have been obvious upon a simply
query. We might describe his failure to understand as willful
ignorance in the colloquial sense of the phrase, that is, he probably did
not want to know whether he might have coerced consent, and in that
sense was "willfully" ignorant. However, it does not appear to fit the
technical term of art as defined by the Canadian Supreme Court in
this case. This could mean it should not be considered willful
ignorance, or that willful ignorance should be redefined to encompass
Sansregret's situation.121
Despite his description of willful ignorance in the usual criminal law
terminology, it seems Judge McIntyre was not really concerned with
inquiry at all. Rather, he is really saying that no inquiry on
Sansregret's part could have remedied the attribution of willful
blindness, because the accused proceeded to have intercourse with the
complainant on the second occasion knowing of the earlier complaint
of rape. This is tantamount to saying that, once Sansregret is aware of
the risk that his violent threats will result in coerced consent to
intercourse, he is presumed to know he does not have consent
whenever he has intercourse following violent threats. Surely such a
defendant is reckless about consent, but is he also willfully ignorant?
Not, as we have seen, according to Judge McIntyre's own description
of willful ignorance. Possibly also not according to what ought to be
considered willful ignorance, but I return to that point below. 129
Third, and most basic, the trial judge, Judge Krindle, had found
insufficient evidence that the defendant knew the complainant's
September complaint had involved a charge of rape. The Supreme
Court disagreed, but it seemed simply to assert this fact without much
in the way of evidence to support it. 130
128. For a suggestion to reconfigure willful blindness to cover this case, see Mark
McElman, A New Conception of Wilful Blindness: The Supreme Court of Canada's
Decision in R. v. Sansregret, 9 Dalhousie J. of Legal Studies 324 (2000).
129. See infra notes 136-51 and accompanying text.
130. See Sansregret, 1 S.C.R. at 582-83. The court noted the following facts: 1) the
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Putting aside these preliminary hurdles, did the Supreme Court
correctly apply the doctrine of willful blindness to the facts as the high
court found them? To answer this requires a greater understanding of
the doctrine. Criminal law has long accepted the common law notion
that one who deliberately avoids learning the truth of some matter can
be charged with knowing it.' The essential purpose of the doctrine
appears to be to inculpate those who connive to avoid responsibility
by intentionally closing their eyes to otherwise obvious facts. The
concept of willful ignorance is defined in different ways by different
courts."' These definitions generally fall within three broad
categories, including those based on the Model Penal Code, on
willfulness, and on recklessness. 33 The differences make it difficult to
generalize about the culpability of willfully ignorant behavior,
specifically, to determine whether it meets or sufficiently
approximates that of knowledge. This is important because willful
blindness is employed as a substitute for a requirement of knowledge,
a practice that can be considered acceptable only if the two are
comparably culpable. Most often these definitions delineate a mens
rea that is not quite the equivalent of knowledge or of recklessness,
and that falls somewhere in between the two in terms of culpability.'
As it was originally employed, the doctrine was used as a
knowledge substitute only for regulatory and other relatively non-
complainant complained to the police about the September incident but was
persuaded not to pursue the matter by Sansregret's probation officer; 2) the
defendant knew the complainant had made a complaint to the police about this
incident and knew his probation officer had called the complainant about the incident
and intervened to prevent her from pursuing charges; 3) the defendant knew that he
was not welcome in the complainant's house and knew "of her attitude towards him";
4) both the defendant and a police officer testified that, when the defendant was
asked why he ran from the police after the October incident, he said "[because of]
that time she 'phoned the police on me before,"' although Sansregret later denied this
on cross examination. It is difficult to understand exactly what part of this evidence
could have led to a finding that Sansregret knew the specific nature of the September
complaint. Where among these facts is the complainant's allegation of a rape, let
alone the defendant's awareness of it? To support a finding of his willful blindness to
the coerced nature of the consent on the second occasion, presumably Sansregret
would have had to have been aware that the complainant considered her consent to
have been coerced or less than genuine on the earlier occasion, so that her signals of
consent the second time around were similarly suspect. Clearly the defendant knew
she had objected to his September behavior and considered it sufficiently unlawful to
involve the police. But it is a long way from "I ended my relationship with the
defendant and he then did something unlawful when he broke into my house and
terrorized me," to "when I had intercourse with him after he broke into my house and
terrorized me, my consent was coerced and not genuine."
131. Charlow, supra note 66, at 1353-54.
132. Id. at 1366.
133. Id. As I have explained elsewhere, even these three categories of definitions
can be further subdivided into pure, mixed disjunctive and mixed conjunctive forms.
Id. at 1366-67. It is not entirely clear which of these formulations Judge McIntyre was
using in his Sansregret decision.
134. Id. at 1382-1400.
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serious offenses. 3 5 In virtually every early application, there were
also special indicia of heightened culpability. 36 Courts focused first
and foremost on the deliberateness of the defendant's effort to avoid
learning or confirming the truth. 3 7 Even when the defendant had
purposefully avoided the truth, courts did not usually apply the
doctrine unless there was also an additional factor that contributed to
the culpability of the behavior involved. 3 ' Early cases exemplify two
such special culpability factors: 1) a motive to further or permit
someone else's illegal act'39 and 2) avoidance of knowledge where the
defendant has an express or implied duty to ascertain the truth of the
fact avoided. 14' More recent cases identify a third attribute indicative
of heightened culpability: an "obstructionist" purpose, that is, a
motive to remain ignorant in order to avoid the criminal consequences
of acting with positive knowledge.'
4 1
I have argued elsewhere that, if willful ignorance is to be used as a
wholesale knowledge substitute and is not restricted to cases
exhibiting these special culpability factors, it should be defined in such
a way as to approach more closely the culpability of knowledge.
42
Thus, one should be charged with knowledge based on his willful
ignorance only if he: 1) has very good information that some fact
exists that makes what he is doing wrong;143 2) comes very close to
believing that the fact exists;1 44 and 3) intentionally avoids establishing
whether the fact exists 145 4) for an evil, dangerous, or otherwise highly
improper reason, that evidences an especially high level of criminal
callousness. 46 While one may take issue with this specific formulation
of willful blindness,1 47 the general notion that the mental state must be
distinguished from recklessness in terms of its culpability, and that its
culpability should closely resemble that of knowledge if it is to
substitute for knowledge, remain valid points.
41
135. Id. at 1400-01.
136. Id. at 1400-13.
137. Id. at 1401.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1401-03 (describing the "connivance" cases of willful blindness).
140. Id. at 1401, 1403-10 (describing the "duty to know" cases of willful blindness).
141. Id. at 1401, 1410-13 (describing the "obstructionist purpose" cases of willful
blindness).
142. Id. at 1357, 1429.
143. Id. at 1414-15 & n.260.
144. Id. at 1415-16.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1415-17.
147. Cf. Douglas N. Husak & Craig A. Callender, Wilful Ignorance, Knowledge,
and the "Equal Culpability" Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of the Principle
of Legality, 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 29 (arguing that willful blindness, however defined,
should not be used as a knowledge substitute because to do so violates the principle of
legality). I am not certain I would now suggest defining willful blindness exactly as I
had over a decade ago.
148. See Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate Ignorance as a Criminal
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Does this view of willful ignorance indicate that the concept was
correctly or incorrectly applied to Sansregret? As for the first
element, one might conclude that the defendant had very good
information that some fact existed that would make what he was
doing wrong. His awareness that he was threatening and frightening
his ex-girlfriend is good information that the fact existed that he was
coercing her consent to a subsequent unwelcome act of intercourse.
Moreover, if we accept the factual finding of the Supreme Court that
he knew he had coerced consent on a previous occasion by acting in a
similar fashion, then surely he had such good information as to put
him on notice that he was now, again, coercing consent.
It also does not seem difficult to establish the last component of this
formulation of willful blindness, the defendant's culpable reason for
having been willfully ignorant, that is, the special culpability factor
that raises the level of his overlooking the obvious above that of
reckless behavior. Assuming Sansregret had deliberately ignored
what he appreciated to be the significant risk of coerced consent, it
would appear easy to find that he had an especially callous reason for
doing so-in order to achieve intimacy with the complainant while
avoiding criminal liability for having coerced sex. This would be
precisely the type of obstructionist purpose demonstrated in the
substantial body of case law on willful ignorance that characterized
the original development of the concept. 149  The defendant
deliberately avoids learning or confirming a fact in order to have his
way without criminal repercussions. This is "core" willful ignorance.
Whether he came very close to believing that he was coercing
consent is a much more difficult issue to resolve. If, as the
complainant verified and the trial judge noted, he was quite adept at
deceiving himself about his ex-girlfriend's feelings for him, especially,
as the trial judge implied, when it served his interest to do so, then
maybe he never even came close to believing that her consent was
coerced. Perhaps he honestly believed all along that as he spoke with
her on the bed she was coming back around to admitting she still
cared for him, which she then confirmed by agreeing to have
Mens Rea, 81 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 191 (1990) (maintaining that it is
unconstitutional to substitute willful ignorance for a statutory requirement of
knowledge because it is merely recklessness and not knowledge); Husak & Callender,
supra note 147, at 36 (stating that the purpose of the doctrine of willful ignorance-
inculpating some who lack knowledge for a knowledge-level crime-is best served
when the concept is described "by a mental state that is not a kind of knowledge but
can plausibly be construed to be the moral equivalent of knowledge"); Comment,
Willful Blindness as a Substitute for Criminal Knowledge, 63 Iowa L. Rev. 466, 466-67,
472-73 (1977) (arguing the unconstitutionality of using willful blindness as knowledge
because it is not knowledge). But see Husak & Callender, supra note 147, at 36
(arguing that willful ignorance should never be used as a knowledge substitute
because such a practice violates the principle of legality).
149. For examples of obstructionist purpose cases and discussion of the
development of this body of law, see Charlow, supra note 66, at 1410-12 & nn. 247-51.
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intercourse. The obvious problem is that it does not seem possible to
determine whether he satisfied this condition. The difficulty in
assessing this factor could mean that the proposed test for willful
ignorance is not a good one, because it might not cover a situation like
this, in which, perhaps, one ought to find that the defendant was
willfully blind to the truth. Maybe requiring proof that the defendant
"almost believes" the fact he is avoiding learning is asking too much.
Perhaps it ought to be enough that he satisfy the first factor, that is,
have very good information that he is deliberately overlooking in
favor of ignorance.
But even if we were to discard the "almost believes" factor as
unworkable, there remains a problem with satisfying the third factor,
the one alluded to in Judge McIntyre's definition for the Canadian
Supreme Court, the willfulness or deliberateness of the defendant's
ignorance, that is, his having engineered his less-than-knowing state of
mind. This element ought more definitely to be a part of any
description of willful blindness, as it encompasses the willfulness of
the ignorance, and thus, is a major component of what makes the
behavior culpable.15 Just as it was difficult to ascertain whether
Sansregret almost believed consent was coerced, it seems equally
difficult to discern and demonstrate whether Sansregret deliberately
ignored the obvious, or, never even appreciated its obviousness
sufficiently to form a deliberate intent to avoid the fact. Exactly how
delusional was he? On the one hand, maybe he deliberately avoided
learning whether he was coercing consent, or, on the other hand,
maybe he simply did not understand or accept that he could not erase
the effect of the terror he had created so soon afterward and while still
in the same fear-filled setting. Was he as culpable as someone who
actually knew he had coerced consent, or only as culpable as someone
who was reckless (aware of the risk of coerced consent) or perhaps
even only negligent (i.e., not aware of the risk) about having coerced
consent?
More importantly, why should it make a difference? It seems
somewhat ludicrous to be asking these questions in this instance.
Shouldn't Sansregret be guilty of rape even if he did not satisfy the
requirements of knowledge or willful blindness? Following the
decision, one Canadian writer suggested that the concept of willful
blindness be reformulated to cover Sansregret's situation.151 Indeed,
the law of rape has changed so that a subjective but unreasonable
mistake about consent would no longer usually suffice to absolve the
defendant of liability.152 In other words, recklessness or something
less, as opposed to knowledge, has now truly become the minimum
required mens rea for a rape conviction in most jurisdictions.
150. See id. at 1400-01.
151. See McElman, supra note 128.
152. See discussion supra Part I.D.I.
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But changes in the law of rape have not erased the more general
problem that Sansregret illustrates with regard to the mens rea of
crimes requiring knowledge. When other knowledge-level crimes are
involved, situations will arise in which traditional definitions of mens
rea do not fit what seem to be compelling cases for liability. In some
instances, willful blindness might apply, but in others, as in Sansregret,
it will not. And even when knowledge or willful blindness do apply, it
may be too difficult to prove the existence of these subjective states of
mind. Should the law in these situations be changed to eliminate the
knowledge requirement altogether, as was done with regard to
consent in rape? Should willful blindness be redefined to cover the
offending situation, as was suggested following Sansregret? Or, is
there some other appropriate resolution, maybe involving
reconceptualizing criminal mental states altogether? These more
general questions relate to the whole of criminal law and are not
specific to rape. Recent scholarship in the areas of mental states and
criminal culpability, even some that does not deal with these questions
directly, may help to answer them.
II. NEW THOUGHTS ON OLD DOCTRINES
In this section, I examine three options for inculpating offenders
who lack knowledge of some fact necessary for conviction of the crime
that their behavior seems to implicate. Theirs are the so-called "bad
acts in search of a mens rea." First, I consider whether this
phenomenon of noncriminal bad acts means that knowledge may be
an inappropriate mens rea altogether. It has proved to be an
unpopular choice in the context of rape. The next section discusses
the rationales for selecting different, lesser mens rea requirements for
rape, and then explores whether these or similar arguments apply to
other knowledge-level crimes. I use as examples the federal drug
offenses, because they account for such a large proportion of federal
convictions, and the "bad check" category of fraud offenses, because
they are of relatively recent origin, ubiquitous at the state level, and
possibly a good counterexample to rape and drug crimes when it
comes to mens rea justifications. Although eliminating the knowledge
requirement seems an easy remedy, I ultimately conclude that there
are crimes for which knowledge appears to remain an appropriate
culpable mental state. For some offenses, such as drug crimes, the
knowledge element might be reduced or used along with other mental
states as part of a more involved grading scheme. But for other
offenses, such as property crimes, these seem unappealing
alternatives.
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A. Eliminate the Mens Rea of Knowledge
The simplest possible resolution of the dilemma posed by having to
prove knowledge when it does not exist might be to eliminate the
knowledge element. As noted, this is essentially what occurred with
regard to the law of rape in those jurisdictions in which knowledge of
nonconsent or coerced consent had previously been required. Is the
rape example one of universal applicability, and would it remedy the
problem of inculpating Sansregret?
The short answer to the universality question is "No." The
requirement of knowledge of nonconsent was controversial in the
rape context from the time it was announced by the House of Lords in
the Morgan case 153 in 1975.154 Moreover, at least in the modern era, it
was never universally the rule, as different jurisdictions followed
different, often lesser, mens rea standards. Finally, scholarship on the
subject of rape over the last twenty or thirty years not only called into
question the appropriateness of requiring knowledge of nonconsent to
prove rape, but sometimes even went so far as to suggest that no
culpable mental state requirement should attach to the element of
nonconsent in rape, making it essentially a strict liability offense. 155 In
short, for more than a generation, rape in particular has been the
subject of sustained, emphatic, and widespread examination and
reexamination, 56 especially including debate over the proper mens rea
requirement. 157  The same cannot be said of most, if not all, other
crimes containing a significant knowledge requirement.
153. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Morgan, 1976 A.C. 182 (H.L. 1975) (appeal taken
from C.A.).
154. Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its Processes:
Cases and Materials 322-23 (6th ed. 1995) (noting controversy over Morgan); LaFave,
supra note 14, § 7.18(e), at 761 ("[Tlhe commentators have not been kind to Morgan
('notorious,' 'shocking' and 'shameful' are among the adjectives used in describing the
case.")).
155. LaFave, supra note 14, § 7.18(e), at 760 (outlining basic arguments for a strict
liability standard with regard to nonconsent); Lynne Henderson, Rape and
Responsibility, 11 Law & Philosophy 127, 154 (1992); accord Dressier, supra note 12, §
33.05, at 587 ("[A] number of American jurisdictions have ruled that even a
defendant's reasonable mistake of fact regarding the female's lack of consent is not a
defense."); see also Schulhofer, supra note 12, at 284 (proposing a model rape statute
in which criminal negligence regarding consent can result in conviction for a felony).
But see Dressier, supra note 12, § 33.05, at 587 ("If a male genuinely and reasonably
believes that the female is consenting, then he is acting without moral culpability.
The effect of dispensing with the reasonable-mistake-of-fact doctrine is, effectively, to
convert rape, a felony carrying severe penalties, into a strict liability offense."); accord
Joshua Dressier, Where We Have Been, and Where We Might Be Going: Some
Cautionary Reflections on Rape Law Reform, 46 Clev. St. L. Rev. 409, 433 (1998) ("It
is wrong to use the bludgeon of the criminal law to impose rules intended to change
cultural attitudes when this means punishing an individual for rape who made a
mistake that the community ... would characterize as reasonable.").
156. See LaFave, supra note 14, § 7.18 (b), at 754-55 (describing the intense public
controversy over rape in "more recent times").
157. See generally Bryden, supra, note 22, at 323 (surveying "the scholarly effort to
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But we ought not to dismiss the lesson learned from the rape
revolution simply by observing that a similar revolt has not taken
place in other areas of criminal law. After all, if knowledge was the
wrong requirement for nonconsent in rape, maybe it is also the wrong
requirement for other crimes that have not caught the popular
attention, but that nevertheless are equally deserving of reform. To
explore this possibility, it would be useful to understand why
knowledge was the wrong requirement for rape, and actually the
antecedent question of why knowledge was required in the first place
for conviction of rape, or of any other crime. The reasons
undoubtedly differ from crime to crime. Moreover, sometimes-
actually, often-they may not have been overtly explained by the
crime-defining authorities, and so must be surmised in retrospect.
Let's begin with rape. Why was knowledge ever considered an
appropriate mens rea with regard to nonconsent? Rape is a very
serious offense, for which potentially substantial prison sentences are
either required or permitted.158 At the same time, the criminal act
involved in a rape-intercourse-is one that is usually wholly
innocent, if accomplished with consent."9 This act most often takes
place in a setting in which there are no witnesses, beyond the two
participants, who might confirm or refute allegations of nonconsent or
the reasonable appearance of consent. 60 Finally, the dynamics of
intimate social interaction between the sexes, in which one's desires
may be mixed and are frequently unspoken, only adds to the
complexity of the problem, as it often may not be clear whether or not
sex is desired.'61 In such a situation, it is quite possible, sometimes
redefine rape," including reexamination of the mens rea).
158. Dressier, supra note 12, § 33.02[C], at 571 ("[R]ape is treated as a very
serious-often the most serious-non-homicide felony.... [M]ost states set the
maximum penalty at life imprisonment or a substantial term of years."); id. §
33.03[B][1], at 574 ("[R]ape is considered a serious offense in all states."); LaFave,
supra note 14, § 7.21(e), at 788 ("The offense of rape has always been subject to very
high penalties in this country," for a long time including the death penalty.). See, e.g.,
N.Y. Penal Law § 130.35 (McKinney 1998) & § 70.02(3)(a) (McKinney Supp. 2000)
(classifying first degree rape as a Class B felony and authorizing five to twenty-five
years imprisonment for such felonies).
159. See LaFave, supra note 14, § 7.21(b), at 784 (describing rape as "premised on
conduct that under other circumstances may be welcomed by the 'victim' (quoting
Model Penal Code § 213.6 cmt.6 (1980))); Schulhofer, supra note 12, at 279
(explaining that focus on the force element in defining rape is misplaced because
"many of the ... physical aspects of sexuality ... are expected and pleasurable,
provided that there is consent"); Note, Recent Statutory Developments in the
Definition of Forcible Rape, 61 Va. L. Rev. 1500, 1503 (1975) ("[Rape] is the only
form of violent criminal assault in which the physical act... may, under other
circumstances, be desirable to the victim.").
160. Wertheimer, supra note 49, at 559 (noting that "sexual relations typically
occur in private").
161. See Model Penal Code § 213.1 cmt. 4 (1980) ("The deceptively simple notion
of consent may obscure a tangled mesh of psychological complexity, ambiguous
communication, and unconscious restructuring of the event by the participants.");
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even reasonable, to make a mistake about consent. The issue then
becomes who should bear the burden of mistake. Given the high
stakes entailed in a rape conviction, coupled with the understandable
room for error about consent, it made sense for some authorities to
have required knowledge of nonconsent' 62 Perhaps the thinking was
that a defendant ought not to face spending the bulk of his adult life in
prison unless he was actually aware that he did not have his partner's
consent to intercourse, even if he was aware that protestations of
nonconsent might mean that there was, indeed, a risk of no consent.
Whatever the wisdom of the old knowledge requirement, we have
now essentially come to think differently about the balance of equities
involved in rape. Proponents of rape reform focused the spotlight on
the other side of the scales, that is, the serious invasion of bodily and
psychological integrity that occurs in rape. 63 They argued the
necessity for and ease of obtaining clarification about consent, given
the substantial interest in avoiding a mistake.'64 Analogies were
LaFave, supra note 14, § 7.20(a), at 774-75 (discussing arguments for and against a
"no means no" rule regarding consent, including consideration "of the complex
dynamics attending sexual activity between acquaintances, the circumstance most
often giving rise to the issue of how silence should be interpreted"); Douglas N.
Husak & George C. Thomas II1, Date Rape, Social Convention, and Reasonable
Mistakes, 11 Law & Philosophy 95 (1992) (exploring how mistakes of fact about
consent can occur); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape
Law and Beyond, 11 Law & Philosophy 35, 41-45 (1992) (discussing a "no means no"
standard and the difficulty of determining consent in a variety of factual situations);
id. at 59-68 (discussing how we determine consent when, "in the messy, emotionally
ambiguous real world of dating, petting, and sexual exploration, 'no' doesn't always
mean no"); id. at 259-60 (citing studies showing that "no" does not always mean no)
(1992); Wertheimer, supra note 49, at 559 (noting that participants in sexual relations
may have different perceptions of the events).
162. One proposed reform of rape law is to provide for gradations of rape, with
different penalties attaching depending on the level of the defendant's mens rea
regarding consent. See Schulhofer, supra note 12, at 283-84 (proposing a model
statutory scheme with lesser crimes of negligent sexual assault and abuse).
163. See Dressier, supra note 12, § 33.03[A][2] (describing rape as "a crime of
violence," "a sexual invasion" in which a woman's "'private, personal inner space' is
violated," "an internal assault, an assault on [a woman's] psyche, and a violation of
[her] privacy," an act that "denies the woman autonomy," and "a hostile, humiliating,
degrading act"); LaFave, supra note 14, § 7.18(b), at 755 (classifying rape as a crime
against the person, intended to protect the female's freedom of choice); Schulhofer,
supra note 12, at 276 ("[Tjhere is no reason to doubt that for the great majority-
especially among women-the right to choose or refuse intimacy, and to do so freely,
without coercive pressure or constraint, is among the most precious components of
personal freedom."); McElman, supra note 128, at 331 (stating that feminists believe
that subjective determination of guilt in rape inappropriately "sacrifices women's
interest in the security of their bodies to the liberty interests of male accused").
164. See Toni Pickard, Culpable Mistakes and Rape: Relating Mens Rea to the
Crime, 30 U. Toronto L.J. 75, 77 (1980) ("There can be little doubt that the cost of
taking reasonable care is insignificant compared with the harm which can be avoided
through its exercise: indeed, the only cost I can identify is the general one of creating
some pressure towards greater explicitness in sexual contexts. To accept an honest but
unreasonable belief in consent as a sufficient answer in these circumstances is to
countenance the doing of a major harm that could have been avoided at no
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drawn to other crimes of bodily or possessory integrity in which the
onus is on the invader to establish good reason for the invasion, rather
than the other way around.165 These and other arguments caused
formerly knowledge-requiring jurisdictions to recalibrate the scales, so
that the burden of at least unreasonable mistake about consent in rape
now falls on the accused.166
Can an analogous case be made, for example, for drug crimes
(manufacture, distribution, possession, and importation), so that
knowledge can be eliminated there as well? Possibly. These crimes
usually require the actor's knowledge that he or she is dealing with a
narcotic or other regulated or prohibited drug.167 In this context, why
was it and does it continue to be thought insufficient for criminal
culpability to have been reckless about the nature of what one
manufactured, distributed, possessed, or imported?16 Like rape,
these are crimes carrying potentially very significant prison terms,
terms that seem only to be increasing as mandatory minimum
sentences are superimposed on existing statutory punishments.169
appreciable cost."); Schulhofer, supra note 12, at 99-100 (explaining that physical
coercion is not required for criminal law redress of property invasions, though sexual
autonomy is treated differently); id. at 272 ("The legal standard must move away from
the demand for unambiguous evidence of [a woman's] protests and insist instead that
the man have affirmative indications that she chose to participate.").
165. See Dressier, supra note 12, § 33.04[B][2][b], at 583-84 (justifying the holding
of a case requiring affirmative permission for sex by analogy to theft); LaFave, supra
note 14, § 7.20(a), at 775 (explaining that only in rape is the "default" position that
consent exists, while in other areas of law consent to an invasion of the victim's
interests must be affirmatively established).
166. If an honest but unreasonable mistake about consent no longer suffices to
exonerate, the required mens rea cannot be knowledge of nonconsent and must be
recklessness (awareness of a risk of nonconsent about which a reasonable person
would not make a mistake) or something less (e.g., negligence-making a mistake
about consent that a reasonable person would not make, but without even the
awareness of the risk of the mistake). See discussion supra notes 56-57 and
accompanying text. But see Berliner, supra note 40, at 2706 (concluding that the
reasonable mistake defense "has developed into a common law loophole" that
operates to reintroduce the discarded notion of victim resistance, thus making it more
rather than less difficult to convict in some rape situations).
167. See supra note 13 for citations to the relevant federal drug laws.
168. Despite substantial research into the current federal drug laws and their
historic antecedents, I have been unable to find any material explaining why Congress
actually chose knowledge, as opposed to some lesser standard such as recklessness, as
the mens rea for these crimes. The analysis that follows in the text is based on
conjecture. Cf United States v. Ekwunoh, 888 F. Supp. 364, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)
(commending People v. Ryan, 626 N.E.2d 51 (N.Y. 1993), for its conclusion that a
defendant is not deserving of an enhanced punishment for possessing a greater
quantity of drugs unless he is aware that he possesses the greater quantity because
this knowledge requirement avoids "over-penalizing someone who unwittingly
possessed a larger amount of a controlled substance than anticipated" and therefore
did not act in the "more repugnant" and more socially threatening way contemplated
by the legislature in the enhanced penalty provision).
169. See Norman Abrams & Sara S. Beale, Federal Criminal Law and its
Enforcement 278-79 (3d ed. 2000) (noting mandatory minimum sentences of ten years
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Also, perhaps the very idea of such crimes is to target only those who
are aware that they are dealing with certain illegal drugs. For
example, in the case of possession or importation, while it may be
reckless, stupid, and irresponsible to have in one's possession or to
bring into the country a package with unknown but maybe suspicious
contents, it may seem too harsh to hold people who might have
foolishly done so-as a favor to a friend, for example-to the same
heavy penalty as those who knew that the package they carried
contained narcotics. 7" Added to this is the ambiguity of the physical
evidence in many drug cases, consisting of the invisible contents of a
closed package. 7' As in the case of rape, perhaps this ambiguity
creates a greater danger that understandable, even reasonable,
mistakes may be made about the contents of what one carries. Or,
perhaps such evidence gives rise to the fear that juries will too easily
assume that a defendant is reckless, aware at least of the risk that a
package in his possession contains drugs, when there often will be no
evidence indicating whether he was or was not aware of such a risk.'72
All these factors might contribute to the perception that imposing
long prison sentences on individuals who may have possessed or
imported such ambiguous items only recklessly, without proof of
actual awareness of the nature of their illegal contents, is simply too
severe.
On the other hand, to play devil's advocate, setting the required
mens rea for drug-related crimes at recklessness rather than
knowledge would not create a blatantly obvious injustice.'73 Only one
for a first offense and twenty years for a second offense under the primary federal
drug statute, in addition to other new civil and criminal penalties enacted in the
1980s).
170. This could be analogous to the rationale for knowledge as the mens rea of
rape, that it may have seemed too harsh to hold for rape someone who, however
stupidly or foolishly, thought he had consent for intercourse even though aware there
was good reason to believe he did not. See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text;
cf H.R. Rep. No. 107-306, at 5-6 (2001) (explaining congressional inclusion of a mens
rea of "intent to convey false.., information" in the Anti-hoax Terrorism Act of 2001
as stemming from the desire to protect "innocent or inadvertent behavior" from
criminalization).
171. This could be analogous to the difficulty of proof in rape situations, where
there usually are no other witnesses or objective evidence beyond the conflicting
testimony of the two people involved, and where interpretation of sometimes subtle,
unspoken communication is at issue. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
172. Setting the mens rea at knowledge rather than recklessness would at least
require the prosecutor to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
actually knew what was in the package, and not simply that he was aware of a risk
that the package contained drugs.
173. See, e.g., Husak & Callender, supra note 147, at 63 & n.133 ("Statutes
proscribing drug possession.., are the prime candidates for modification [from a
mens rea of knowledge to recklessness.]"). When I say there would not be a
"blatantly obvious injustice" in switching the mens rea, I do not mean that I
necessarily think this is the best, or even a particularly good, outcome. Rather, I
mean that an argument analogous to the one already made in the rape context is not
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who was reckless, that is, to take the example of importation, was
aware of the risk that he was carrying narcotics across the border,
where that risk was substantial and unjustifiable (and maybe he would
even need to be aware that it was substantial and unjustifiable"7 4),
would be liable for the potentially onerous penalty. Those who favor
harsh drug laws often point to the serious ill effects of drug use and
addiction on individual users and the wide-ranging societal scourge of
drugs, including associated violent activity.'75 Also, as in the case of
rape, it would often be relatively easy for someone faced with
ambiguous evidence of the fact in issue (the closed parcel) to clarify
the matter (ask about or inspect its contents). If one considers these
countervailing equities in the drug context that are arguably
analogous to those in the rape context, the reluctance to embrace
reckless individuals under the umbrella of drug offenses is not crystal
clear. 76 Moreover, as in the rape context, in order to avoid claims of
unjust harshness, it would also be possible to provide gradations of
drug offenses based on mens rea, reserving the most serious penalties
for those with positive knowledge and imposing lesser punishments on
those who act recklessly. 77 In short, perhaps drug offenses are not the
best counterexample, one in which the need for or desirability of a
knowledge-level mens rea is entirely secure.
clearly inapt.
174. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 801(2) (2001) ("The Congress makes the following
findings and declarations: ... The illegal importation, manufacture, distribution, and
possession and improper use of controlled substances have a substantial and
detrimental effect on the health and general welfare of the American people.");
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1002-03 (1991) ("Quite apart from the pernicious
effects on the individual who consumes illegal drugs, such drugs relate to crime....
Studies... demonstrate a direct nexus between illegal drugs and crimes of
violence."); id. at 1022 ("Drugs are without doubt a serious societal problem....
Unlike crimes directed against the persons and property of others, possession of drugs
affects the criminal who uses the drugs most directly," and creates a "ripple effect on
society" through "lost productivity, health problems, and the like.") (White, J.,
dissenting); Alison Bass, Substance Abuse Trend Worries Health Officials, Boston
Globe, Oct. 19, 1995, (Metro/Region), at I ("Substance abuse has far-reaching effects
on the health and economic well-being of many Massachusetts residents, even those
who do not use drugs themselves," according to the state commissioner of public
health; "[S]ubstance abuse ... is a major factor in the spread of AIDS, health
problems among newborn babies, violence, auto fatalities and costly hospital
emergency room visits," according to a report prepared by a Washington think tank
analyzing local and national studies covering 1988-1994.). A word of disclaimer: I am
not personally taking a position on the drug problem, but merely noting that these are
among the arguments voiced to support severe criminal punishments for drug
offenses. Cf Husak & Callender, supra note 147, at 61-62 (misconstruing arguments
that could be made on this issue for positions held by the author).
176. As stated above, I am not personally advocating that either knowledge or
recklessness is the proper mens rea for drug crimes, nor taking a position on the
underlying social issues. See supra note 175.
177. Cf. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale L.J. 1087, 1102 (1986) (proposing punishment
for negligent rapists, but, as in murder, less severe than for those who commit the
prohibited act purposefully or knowingly).
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A better case for retaining the requirement of knowledge probably
could be made in the areas of fraud, 7 ' perjury, 179 and receipt of stolen
property. Fraud-related crimes might include certain property crimes
(theft by false pretenses, drawing a "bad check"), as well as the crime
of making false statements to public officials or to obtain public
benefits. 8" In the case of fraud, individuals may be criminally
punished in various circumstances for knowingly making false
representations. We might surmise why it is that these crimes require
knowledge rather than recklessness regarding the falsity of the
representation.' Take, for example, "bad check" statutes, which
punish, among other things, drawing a check knowing that one does
not have funds to cover it.'82 Effectively, the check giver is falsely
representing that he has enough money in his account to make good
on the check when in fact he knows he does not. Why did the
legislatures that adopted these statutes decide not to inculpate those
who wrote bad checks recklessly, that is, aware of the substantial and
unjustifiable risk that they did not have sufficient funds?
The idea must have been that, however morally inappropriate it is
to be consciously careless about drawing a bad check, it is not culpable
enough to warrant criminal rather than civil sanction. The bad check
crime derived from the crime of false pretenses 83 and adopted
essentially the same mens rea of knowingly making a false
representation, in this case, knowingly making the implied, false
representation that there are or will be sufficient funds in the account
indicated on the check to honor it. Despite this evolution, however, it
178. Fraud is defined as: "A knowing misrepresentation of the truth ... to induce
another to act to his or her detriment." Black's Law Dictionary 670 (7th ed. 1999).
179. Perjury is defined as: "[A] person's deliberately making material false or
misleading statements while under oath." Id. at 1160; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2000)
(federal perjury statute).
180. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000) (federal false statement statute).
181. Making a representation that something is the case when one knows one does
not know whether it is the case may also qualify as knowingly making a false
representation. See LaFave, supra note 14, § 8.7(f), at 840 & nn.80-82. It is possible
to view this as an instance of recklessly making a false statement, that is, representing
as fact something that you are aware there is a substantial and unjustifiable risk is not
fact. Or, one could view this as knowingly making a false statement, that is,
representing as fact something that you are aware you do not know to be a fact. It is
unclear whether the criminal law consistently treats the above-described instance as a
knowing or reckless misrepresentation, but most sources continue to describe the
mens rea for false representation crimes as knowledge of falsity and not recklessness
as to truth.
182. LaFave, supra note 14, § 8.9(b), at 853 (indicating that most bad check statutes
require only knowledge of the insufficient funds); see, e.g., Annotation, Construction,
Application, and Effect of Criminal Statutes Directed Specifically Against Use of
Worthless, False, or Bogus Check or Draft, 35 A.L.R. 375, 376-78 (1925).
183. There were several difficulties in relying on the crime of false pretenses to
combat the problem of worthless checks, which led to the development and adoption
of bad checks statutes. LaFave, supra note 14, § 8.9(a), at 851-52; Model Penal Code
§ 224.5 cmt.1 (1980).
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is not enough to say knowledge was required for this crime because it
was required for the antecedent crime of false pretenses. The mens
rea for the two offenses is not identical, as an intent to defraud is also
necessary for the false pretense offense but not under many bad check
statutes. 184 Moreover, it would still remain to determine either why
knowledge was a part of the requirements for the antecedent crime or,
more importantly, why this element of the antecedent mens rea was
retained for this new, and otherwise different, offense.185
One could posit at least two reasons for the legislative conclusion
that drawing a bad check must be accompanied at least by knowledge
that the check is "bad" in order to qualify as a crime. First, writing a
bad check involves injury to another's property interest-the payee
will be out a certain amount of money.186 While this may be an
interest legitimately to be protected by criminal sanction, it is not
usually considered as important an interest as physical well-being."8
Therefore, it would be natural for crimes of financial injury to be
harder to establish-and hence the harm less often criminally
punished-than crimes of physical injury. It would be understandable
for legislatures adopting bad check statutes to have viewed the
property interest involved as rising to a level warranting criminal
protection only when the injury is done by someone who is at least
aware that he actually is cheating the payee, not just aware that there
is a (substantial and unjustifiable) risk that he might be. Second, we
can easily envision actors who are not especially evil being reckless
about writing a bad check. I'm busy; I don't know how much money
is in my account, though I'm aware that it might not be enough to
cover this check; however, some bill is long overdue; and so I write the
check. I've committed a consciously careless act. It's not admirable
184. See Model Penal Code § 224.5 cmt. 2 (1980) (explaining that the model statute
"aligns itself with those pre-existing bad-check laws that defined the criminal state of
mind as knowledge that the check will not be paid rather than as an intent to
defraud," and that this "lower culpability level is a common feature of recently
drafted bad check laws" (footnotes omitted)).
185. Theft by false pretenses and bad checks are not treated exactly the same in
criminal law. As noted above, they do not always contain the same mens rea. See
supra note 184. In addition, the punishment for the latter is usually less severe. See
LaFave, supra note 14, § 8.9, at 851. Here again, as with the federal drug laws,
significant research has not revealed any legislative or even judicial explanation for
the selection of knowledge rather than recklessness as the mens rea for bad check
statutes.
186. These statutes were intended to criminalize drawing bad checks in order to
protect the commercial and banking systems and public confidence in them. See, e.g.,
State v. Avery, 207 P. 838, 839 (Kan. 1922) (stating that the purpose of the worthless
check act was "generally to avert .. . mischief to trade, commerce, and banking");
LaFave, supra note 14, § 8.9(b), at 852-53.
187. One indirect indication of this is that bad check offenses are usually only
misdemeanors, unless a certain sum or repeat offender was involved, and in some
jurisdictions are limited to misdemeanor status. See LaFave, supra note 14, § 8.9(b), at
853.
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for sure, and the drawee should have redress against me, but should I
be considered a criminal? Have I yet crossed the line from private to
public nuisance? On the other hand, suppose the same scenario,
except that I actually know I do not have enough money to cover the
check and decide to send it anyway. Now I'm not just consciously
careless. I know that I'm invading someone else's property interest,
yet I go right ahead. In this case, it is harder to imagine ourselves as
that person. It would be understandable if legislatures found the
latter act and actor significantly more repugnant, sufficiently more to
warrant criminal sanction. At the point at which I am actually aware
that I am mucking up the system and don't care enough to restrain
myself, perhaps I have crossed the line from private to public
wrongdoer.
If these factors help to explain why knowledge is the required mens
rea for bad check offenses, they might also seem to account for any
reluctance to lower the mens rea, as was done for rape or arguably
might be done for drug crimes. The property injury involved is
usually considered less important than the physical and psychological
integrity injuries involved in rape. As discussed above, this was one
significant point made in the attack on the old rape laws.""8 The
property injury is also arguably distinct from the harms at issue in
drug cases, which could be viewed as potential physical injury to
ultimate drug users and the enormous social tolls of drug use."8 9
Financial injuries of the sort encountered in connection with bad
checks often seem properly redressed as commercial matters, under
civil law. While physical integrity is so vital that we might want to
shift the onus of a mistake about consent to engage in intercourse
onto those who make it, there does not seem to be any comparable
argument to be made for shifting the onus of mistake about how much
money was in one's bank account. As with rape and drug
importation, we probably could readily ascertain the matter in
question (whether we had sufficient funds), but, in the latter instance,
we do not appear to be quite as evil if we fail to do so. In short,
people who are consciously careless about others' financial interests
simply do not seem as reprehensible as those who are consciously
careless about others' physical and psychological well-being. Also, in
contrast to rape or drug offenses, one would be hard pressed to point
to the social scourge of bad checks, however plentiful they may be.9
Mistakes about sufficient funds do not usually lead to such ills as lives
wasting away in narcotic stupors, the violence associated with drug
188. See discussion supra notes 164, 166 and accompanying text.
189. See discussion supra note 175 and accompanying text.
190. See LaFave, supra note 14, § 8.9(c), at 854 (providing, as an example of the
widespread incidence of bad checks, the fact "that one-half of one per cent [sic] of all
checks written in Nebraska were bad checks," the vast majority involving insufficient
funds).
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crime, or the physical and psychological violence inflicted during
unwanted sex that is claimed to be widespread in cases of "date
rape.
19 1
Similar arguments could be made for other fraud and false
statement crimes, and for receipt of stolen property, all of which
involve property as opposed to bodily harm. At the end of the day,
even if there are some crimes currently requiring knowledge that
could reasonably be altered to require a lesser mens rea, there will
inevitably be others for which knowledge remains an apparently
preferable standard. The problem that arose in Sansregret cannot be
obviated across the spectrum of criminal law simply by eliminating the
requirement of knowledge.
Moreover, it is not entirely certain that lowering the culpable
mental state for rape from knowledge to recklessness would have
resulted in Sansregret's conviction. As discussed earlier, it certainly
would have been easier to find the defendant guilty if the fact-finder
had only to conclude that Sansregret was aware of the risk that his
victim's consent was coerced, rather than to find that he knew her
consent was coerced.192 However, both these mens rea require
findings of subjective states of mind. In the case of knowledge,
awareness of the fact is required and in the case of recklessness,
awareness of the risk of the fact is required. Crediting his ex-
girlfriend's testimony about his level of self-delusion, it might still be
difficult for a fact-finder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
Sansregret was aware even of the risk of coerced consent at the time
of intercourse. Eliminating the knowledge requirement not only is
not a universally transferable idea, it might not even have assured the
desired result in Sansregret.
B. New and Improved Willful Blindness
Another proposed solution to the Sansregret problem was to
redefine one of the traditional mental states so that it fit the facts
involved. Mark McElman, writing specifically about the Sansregret
case, did just that. He suggested "a new conception of wilful
blindness" that would include what was apparently going on in
Sansregret's mind at the time he had intercourse with his ex-
girlfriend.193 McElman did this by drawing a distinction between what
he calls a "deliberate" suppression of risk awareness, which is the
construct encompassed by traditional definitions of willful blindness,
191. See, e.g., Dressier, supra note 12, § 33.02, at 571-72 (detailing statistics on the
incidence of rape); Estrich, supra note 12, at 10-15 (discussing the incidence of forced
sex, particularly among acquaintances).
192. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
193. See McElman, supra note 128, at 343.
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and what he terms an "active" suppression of awareness, which is his
suggested alternative formulation. 94
This section explores McElman's thesis in some detail, and then
rejects it as an acceptable corrective for the conundrum of
incriminating the type of bad acts under examination. His proposed
reformulation of willful blindness suffers from problems in its
conceptualization. In addition, it would not even inculpate
Sansregret. But more importantly, it does not translate well beyond
the specific context in which he crafted it, and, if adopted, could result
in exonerating more wrongdoers across the spectrum of crimes than it
indicts.
When McElman uses the term "deliberate suppression" he means
to refer to that aspect of traditional willful blindness that involves
deliberately turning away from positive knowledge, or declining to
make inquiry, in order to avoid learning or knowing the truth after
one becomes aware of the need for inquiry.195 He is dissatisfied with
this definition of willful ignorance, as were others who had
commented earlier on the subject, because it does not adequately
distinguish willful blindness-and therefore knowledge-from
recklessness. 196
To remedy this problem, he proposes using instead "active
suppression" as the proper conception of willful blindness. Since he
does not quite define active suppression, this takes some explication.
McElman begins by establishing that, in traditional epistemological
terms, knowledge is a tripartite construct, requiring "[1] justified, [2]
true [3] belief."' 97  This epistemological definition contains both
objective and subjective elements: 1) the belief is subjective; 2) the
truth of what is believed is objective; and 3) the condition of
justification is a hybrid objective-subjective concept that links the
(subjective) belief to the (objective) fact.' 98 Justification is subjective
in that it must actually be held in the mind of the believer, but also
objective in that it must "be objectively capable of supporting the
inference that the fact believed is probable."' 99
McElman distinguishes the legal element of knowledge from this
epistemological model by arguing that legal knowledge is only a
194. Id. at 331.
195. Id. at 330.
196. Id. at 331 ("This doctrine has an uneasy feel .... On this account, it seems that
wilful blindness may simply be a convoluted form of recklessness."). Accord Robbins,
supra note 148, at 195-96, 232-34; see also Charlow, supra note 66, at 1382-90
(explaining that willful ignorance takes many forms, some of which are more like
recklessness than knowledge).
197. McElman, supra note 128, at 332. "Thus, one has knowledge in respect of
some fact if, and only if one believes the fact to be true, one is justified in believing it
to be true, and the fact is, indeed, true." Id. at 332-33.
198. Id. at 333.
199. Id.
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bipartite construct, one that eliminates the justification element.
Thus, legal knowledge requires only: 1) that "the prescribed
condition actually existed at the time of the alleged offence" (an
objective element-part of the actus reus of the crime), and 2) that
"the ... accused believed the condition to exist" (a subjective
element-the mens rea of knowledge). 20 This formulation, McElman
believes, is too simplistic and results in "error[s]" in which punishment
is imposed "in absurd ways," that is, on those who are no more than
foolish in believing something to be the case when such a belief is not
at all justified (even though it may, quite coincidentally, turn out to be
true in a given instance). 2111 McElman uses the example of a man who
buys a saxophone from a pawnshop mistakenly believing the owner of
the shop to be a crook.02 When the man, consumed by guilt, turns
himself in to the police, it is discovered that the otherwise
exceptionally reputable pawnshop owner had on this unusual occasion
purchased a stolen saxophone.2 3 McElman argues that it would be
error to punish the man, though he correctly believed he was
purchasing stolen goods, because his belief was not justified, and this
unjustified but true belief is a form of mistake.2°
To avoid such errors, McElman maintains that the criminal law
must interpose the exculpatory doctrine of mistake. 5 However,
according to McElman, under present law a mistake will exculpate on
the sole condition that the mistaken belief is honestly, or actually,
held, which can lead to absurd results .2 " For example, absurd results
occur because the mistake doctrine does not distinguish, as do
200. Id. There is disagreement in the literature about whether legal knowledge
actually differs from epistemological knowledge in this regard. One article maintains
that justification is an essential element of legal as well as philosophical
understandings of knowledge. See Husak & Callender, supra note 147, at 47-48.
Apparently, the authors reach this conclusion by reasoning that one must be
responsible in order for criminal liability to attach, and that one cannot be responsible
for simply having a true belief because people "have little voluntary control over what
they believe" and no control over what is true. Id. at 47 n.72. Professor Pillsbury, as
explained in the following section, would appear to disagree with the underlying
premise of this argument, that people have little voluntary control over what they
believe and therefore are not responsible for it. See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
201. McElman, supra note 128, at 333-34.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 334.
204. Id. Though McElman calls this a "mistake," it is not like the mistake of fact
that normally excuses in criminal law, as the man does not hold a subjective belief
about the fact in question (presumably, the stolen nature of the goods) that is
contrary to objective reality. Indeed, it is somewhat confusing to call the man's
correct belief that the saxophone was stolen a mistake. Perhaps McElman does so, in
part, because the man has made a factual mistake about the honesty of the pawnshop
owner, but that fact is not likely to be an element of an applicable criminal offense, as
the fact of the stolen nature of the goods obtained might be.
205. Id. As McElman impliedly acknowledges, the mistake in his previous example
does not meet the standard for exculpatory mistakes in criminal law. Id. at 334-35.
206. Id. at 334-45.
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epistemologists, between honestly held "recalcitrant" beliefs and
other honestly held beliefs. Recalcitrant beliefs are "unresponsive to
change, due to a high degree of internal coherence," even when that
internal coherence is not only objectively unjustified but actually
ridiculous."7 When people hold such recalcitrant beliefs, "perceptual
indications inconsistent with the cohered system are discarded as
unworthy of consideration or belief."2" 8 In other words, people with
honest but recalcitrant beliefs actively suppress the truth. 09
According to McElman, such people do not deliberately suppress
knowledge, in the deliberate sense of willful blindness, but they do
actively suppress knowledge, in the epistemological sense just
described.
McElman then explains why he thinks active suppressers are
criminally culpable people. First, active suppressers are not
responsive to their environment because they hold beliefs that cohere
into a system and are not isolated mistakes. Their recalcitrant beliefs
"distort [their] perception of reality and actively suppress[] the
formation of true belief," such that, unlike reasonable people whose
"beliefs reflect reality," for them reality becomes a reflection of their
beliefs. "" Thus, they are distinguishable from people who make
"simple" mistakes, of the sort we might be inclined to excuse.21'
Second, an active suppresser's recalcitrant web of belief can be
inconsistent with criminal laws that accept premises contrary to those
of the recalcitrant belief. 2 In these instances, the beliefs "deny...
fundamental assumptions of the criminal law" and can "become a law
unto [themselves]. '21 3 Third, active suppressers' beliefs can cause
them to act in ways that put others at risk of harm, whether or not
they realize it, and are sometimes "likely to subject people to the type
of harm contemplated by the law." '214 All these add up to reason to
punish criminally recalcitrant believers- active suppressers -whose
beliefs cause them to reject knowledge of some important fact when
knowledge would normally be required for conviction.
McElman sets out to explain why active suppression of true belief is
a better conception of willful blindness than the traditional deliberate
suppression model. In the end, however, he only establishes why he
thinks deliberate suppression is problematic, then jumps from there to
207. Id. at 336.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 337.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. McElman uses the example of someone who subscribes to an avant garde
scientific theory that cocaine does not exist. This belief, no matter how sincerely held,
is inconsistent with the premise of the criminal law that cocaine does exist. Id. at 335-
37.
213. Id. at 337.
214. Id.
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the assumption that active suppression must be not only a proper
construct for willful blindness but the better one as well. According to
McElman, deliberate suppression fails for two reasons. First, it is
indistinguishable from recklessness. Deliberate aversion of positive
knowledge of a fact only occurs after one is aware of a risk that the
fact exists. "Once the mind has averted to a risk, recklessness attaches
to any actions until concerns about the risk have passed. '215  But
concerns-and therefore recklessness-can only pass by giving the
risk further consideration, not by deliberately ignoring it. Thus,
deliberate suppression necessarily presupposes and is coexistent with
recklessness, not knowledge. Second, "the process of belief formation
is automatic and not subject to influences of the will. ' 216 As soon as
an individual evaluates some justification for believing risk is present,
the individual acquires a belief regarding the risk, and that belief
remains until it ceases to be justified, whether or not the individual
has the belief at the forefront of his mind or even tries to ignore it.217
McElman implies that this means deliberate suppression is an
epistemologically unsound notion. He then concludes that, given
these two problems with deliberate suppression, the doctrine of willful
blindness would better focus on active rather than deliberate
suppression. The active suppression model "is distinct from
recklessness and not founded on shaky epistemological grounds. 218
It is not difficult to see how McElman brings this back around to
Sansregret. He maintains, in essence, that if the defendant's belief
that his ex-girlfriend wanted to have intercourse with him actively
suppressed a correct interpretation of the evidence that he did not
really have her consent, then he should be considered willfully blind
and barred from asserting that his honest but mistaken belief negated
knowledge of her nonconsent.21 9 There are at least three reasons for
this. First, his mistaken belief that she wanted intercourse was likely
recalcitrant, would likely cohere into a myth about the meaning of
particular communications regarding consent, and would then color
his interpretation of her communication to the contrary, so that he
would take "indications of 'no' as indications of 'yes.' 2 ' This kind of
myth, one that actively suppresses the correct interpretation of
communication, cannot be allowed to exculpate because allowing this
would foster the holding of such myths about women and their
consent to sex.221 Second, Sansregret's mistaken belief that his ex-
girlfriend wanted intercourse denies a fundamental premise of the
215. Id. at 338.
216. Id. This view seems to be directly contradicted by Professor Pillsbury. See
discussion infra Part II.C.1.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 340.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 340-41.
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criminal law-to wit, that it is the complainant's attitude alone that
determines whether there is consent-that has been adopted in order
to protect women's sexual autonomy.222 And finally, crediting an
accused's incorrect belief that a complainant desired intercourse "is
likely to place women directly at risk of the very harm contemplated
by [the] sexual assault law." '223  Therefore, Sansregret's active
suppression of the truth about consent is rightfully criminally culpable
and his mistake resulting from this active suppression should not
exculpate him.
There are several weaknesses in McElman's analysis, and we should
be concerned about adopting his proposal in any event. As alluded to
above, he jumps from arguments that deliberate suppression is the
equivalent of recklessness, and epistemologically undesirable, to the
conclusion that active suppression is a proper model for willful
blindness. This is a non sequitur. Perhaps the notion of deliberate
suppression fails sufficiently to emulate knowledge rather than
recklessness, so that willful blindness defined as deliberate
suppression should not serve as a wholesale knowledge equivalent.224
And it also may be that the concept of deliberate suppression is not
epistemologically accurate or defensible. But the proper conclusion
to draw from these proofs is not that deliberate suppression does not
capture the essence of willful blindness, and certainly not that active
suppression does. Rather, it is simply that willful blindness,
understood, as it historically has been, as deliberate suppression, is not
a sound concept in and of itself (epistemologically), and also not a
proper knowledge equivalent.225
Moreover, there is something unsatisfactory about McElman's
arguments regarding his active suppression construct and its
relationship to willful blindness, criminal culpability, and even
Sansregret. It seems at least mildly problematic in the application of
criminal laws to have to distinguish recalcitrant beliefs, especially
those that cohere into a "myth," from "simple" mistakes, that
presumably do not have these characteristics. If these are issues of
fact, then the determinations of recalcitrance, myth, and other similar
matters would devolve to the jury. One only has to imagine a set of
jury instructions explaining the distinction between recalcitrant myths
and other mistakes, let alone defining active suppression, to see the
difficulty. Moreover, McElman's arguments for the culpability that
inheres in recalcitrant beliefs and active suppression seem to boil
down to the premise that there are good reasons to punish someone
222. Id. at 341.
223. Id.
224. For the argument that forms of willful blindness resembling recklessness
rather than knowledge should not be used as knowledge equivalents, see Charlow,
supra note 66; Robbins, supra note 148.
225. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
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like Sansregret criminally, even though he did not have the required
knowledge of nonconsent and did not fit the traditional model of
willful blindness. His arguments in favor of criminal liability are quite
convincing. But they do not even explain why, let alone prove that,
active suppression is or should be willful blindness. Rather, McElman
has provided good reasons to change the mens rea regarding consent
in rape law, or perhaps even to change our traditional limited
catalogue of mens reas generally; he has not provided good reasons to
alter our conception of willful blindness in the way he proposes.226
Considering his suggestion on its merits, it does not seem a good
idea to change the definition of willful ignorance to the active
suppression model. First, the criminal doctrine of willful blindness has
been around for at least 100 years. 27 As I have argued at some length
elsewhere, deliberate suppression, or something very like it, is an
essential part of what evolved into willful blindness, and remains an
essential part, though not the whole, of what makes willfully ignorant
behavior culpable at anything close to the level of knowing
behavior.228 There is no apparent justification for contorting a long
established mental state into something entirely different-possibly
even creating a misnomer in the process 229 - to encompass liability for
someone who simply does not exhibit that mental state. It seems
more sensible instead to propose liability for the offending party on
the basis of the actual, perhaps previously unrecognized, culpable
mental state that he does exhibit.
Second, changing the meaning of willful ignorance could backfire as
an effort (and this is McElman's avowed effort) to encompass more
bad behavior within rape law. Active suppressers might then be guilty
of rape even if the mens rea regarding nonconsent in rape remained
knowledge, but deliberate suppressers, who could be guilty under the
previous definition, might not be. This outcome might not bother
McElman, because he thinks deliberate suppression is only
recklessness and therefore not appropriately inculpatory for a
knowledge-level crime like rape anyway. But a close reading of his
interest in the matter suggests that McElman would inculpate people
like Sansregret, not exonerate reckless rapists.23 ° In fact, some of the
226. It is possible that simply reducing the mens rea regarding consent in rape law
to recklessness still might not ensure Sansregret's conviction. See supra note 193 and
accompanying text. If this is so, it might be advisable to make further changes in the
mens rea of rape, or in the list of available culpable mental states. But these points do
not implicate willful ignorance.
227. See Charlow, supra note 66, at 1353 n.7, 1361-62 (discussing older willful
blindness cases).
228. See id. at 1401, 1415-16.
229. Willful blindness, by its very terms, connotes deliberately engineered aversion
of knowledge, though not necessarily actively suppressed knowledge. "Willful" is
defined as deliberate, not as "active," and "active" is defined in an entirely unrelated
way. See Webster's New World Dictionary 13, 1528 (3d college ed. 1991).
230. McElman provides a singularly unlikely hypothetical to distinguish a
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reasons he gives for wanting to find Sansregret guilty, such as
protecting women's autonomy regarding sex and avoiding incentives
to harbor myths that place women at risk of the very harm
contemplated by the rape law, could just as readily counsel against
exonerating deliberate suppressers, and even reckless rapists, as active
suppressers.
Third, and perhaps most important, changing the meaning of willful
ignorance would have far reaching effects, potentially altering liability
for all crimes for which knowledge is required and willful blindness
may suffice. The fallout would not be limited to rape. Even if he had
made a good case for the propriety of using this device to inculpate all
active suppressers like Sansregret and exculpate all deliberate
suppressers for the particular crime of rape, he has made no case-
and I cannot imagine one-for doing this with regard to any and every
crime containing a knowledge requirement.
Finally, McElman's attempt to cabin Sansregret within his construct
of active suppression is faulty. While he may be correct that
Sansregret held a recalcitrant belief in his victim's desire to have
intercourse with him, and that this belief may have cohered into a
myth about the meaning of particular communications regarding
consent, so that he would be inclined incorrectly to understand
communications of "no" as communications of "yes," this scenario
simply does not fit the facts of the Sansregret episode described by the
complainant and found by the trial judge. As the victim testified, she
did not communicate "no." Rather, she did her very best to
communicate "yes." '231  The problem was not the defendant's
misunderstanding about what the victim communicated regarding
consent, it was his misunderstanding about the effect of his coercive
behavior on the victim. In other words, as explained previously, this
was not really a nonconsent rape case so much as a coerced consent
rape case, in which the victim probably did consent, though only
because she was coerced into doing so. 23 2
It might seem that there is nothing valuable left to McElman's
theory. This is not my conclusion. One must give McElman
substantial credit for attempting to describe the complex nature of
Sansregret's reasoning and mistake, and for distinguishing it from
traditional willful blindness. Equally important, he has unpacked
some of the reasons for the sense of offense that one intuits regarding
supposedly reckless rapist from an active suppresser rapist, but it is not even clear that
the potential accused in that case was subjectively aware of the risk of nonconsent,
and so may not have been even reckless. See McElman, supra note 128, at 342. This
would mean the defendant-however unlikely he is to exist in the first place-
possibly should not be guilty of rape, but not because he was only reckless rather than
knowing about nonconsent.
231. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
232. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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Sansregret's active suppression. These are important points, as they
illuminate the larger issue of bad acts that seem to implicate the very
purposes of crimes the elements of which are nevertheless not met.
His perceptions about the nature of the offensiveness of Sansregret's
mental state are reflected and further developed in the
psychologically-based analysis of Professor Pillsbury, which follows.
In the next section, this article continues McElman's efforts by
exploring the possibility of imposing criminal liability on all of his
active suppressers, including Sansregret, in some other, hopefully less
distorting, way.
C. A New Mens Rea?
One promising prospect to resolve the issue of noncriminal bad acts
is to formulate an entirely new mens rea that identifies what is going
on in the minds of the individuals whose mental states do not conform
to traditional knowledge or willful blindness requirements. In recent
years, several writers have named various forms of "indifference,"
that appear to encompass the relevant state of mind, as sufficiently
culpable mental states to warrant criminal sanction. These notions
seem tailor-made for the problem under examination; surely
Sansregret and McElman's other "active suppressers" exhibited
callous indifference toward their victims. In the following sections, I
explore a particular model of indifference analysis, one based on
relatively recent developments in research in the area of cognitive
psychology. This formulation of indifference as a reprehensible
construct is appealing both on its own terms, and as applied to
inculpate noncriminal bad acts. But it presents practical and
conceptual obstacles in implementation, particularly in asking jurors
to make ad hoc, personal, moral determinations. While it is, perhaps,
the most promising of the suggestions considered, ultimately, like the
previous remedies, it could create more problems than it would
resolve. Indifference analysis might more successfully serve to inform
sentencing, but, as also discussed, that would not rectify the problem
of inculpation.
1. Indifference as a Guilt Determinant
In an article urging that murder and manslaughter liability attach to
certain negligent homicides, Samuel Pillsbury develops a notion of
what he terms "indifference" (or sometimes "callous indifference" or
"moral indifference") that might be useful here as well. Others have
written about indifference as a possible alternative criminal mens rea,
but Pillsbury's development of the notion, based on research in
psychology, seems to have the most relevance in the present context
20021
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of knowledge-level crimes.233 Pillsbury's basic idea is that actual
awareness of the fatal risks involved should not be required for
conviction for unintended killings. He would substitute "indifference
to the value of others" for awareness of the risk of death as the proper
measure of criminality.234 His delineation of indifference as an
alternative mens rea and his arguments for preferring it over
awareness of risk have resonance with the problem at hand and merit
further explication.
Pillsbury explains that the metaphor of introspection motivates our
reliance on awareness of risk as a culpable mental state. We generally
assume that the human mind follows a linear pattern of perception,
information sorting/evaluation, and decision-making.235 In this view,
perception (the first step) is not chosen, and awareness (internal
notice of that perceived-the second step) is a "prerequisite for
choice" (the third step).236 Thus, moral responsibility and criminal
culpability only occur at the third stage of the mental progression,
when a decision is made to act despite the earlier, unchosen
perception of risk.237
In contrast, cognitive scientists assert that the brain does not
operate according to this linear, introspective view of human
intelligence.23 Rather, they see brain function as a "continuous
interaction of rival perceptive and analytic processes." '2 39 In this
model, perception may involve choice. We are bombarded with
sensory data, and can only attend to some of it, so we make choices
about what to perceive (see, hear, etc.) and what to ignore.24
Eventually, we formulate pre-established agendas about what to
perceive or ignore, so that, even though perception usually seems
233. In a recent article, Kimberly Ferzan explores Pillsbury's indifference construct
as well as earlier versions of indifference liability proposed by R. A. Duff and
Kenneth Simons. Kimberly K. Ferzan, Opaque Recklessness, 91 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 597, 611-27 (2001) (citing and evaluating R. A. Duff, Intention, Agency,
and Criminal Liability: Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law (1990), and
Kenneth W. Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory: The Problem of Criminal
Negligence, 1994 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 365). All four of these treatments of forms
of indifference (Duff's "practical indifference," Ferzan's "opaque recklessness,"
Pillsbury's "callous indifference," and Simons' "culpable indifference") engage the
issue of criminal liability for less than traditional reckless conduct, that is, for various
forms of what is now relegated to noncriminal negligence. I have singled out
Pillsbury's ideas to explore in this article because they are substantially grounded in a
view of the human mind that stems from psychological research that, in particular,
appears to have implications not only for negligence but also for the somewhat
different issue of knowledge.
234. Pillsbury, supra note 84, at 106.
235. Id. at 138.
236. Id. at 141.
237. Id. at 129-37.
238. Id. at 138.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 144.
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automatic, it is sometimes actually chosen.241 Attention-whether we
notice a particular fact about the world-similarly may occur as the
result of an automatic process that, at some point in the past, was the
result of a decision about perception priorities.242 As a result,
perception priorities and attention are subject to self-conscious
direction, self-consciousness is essential "to choice, [and] choice may
cover.., both awareness and unawareness. 2 43  Therefore, both
awareness and unawareness may be proper subjects for criminal
responsibility, and "perception should be considered a part of
responsible choice rather than a prerequisite to it." 24
Pillsbury concludes that "[c]riminal responsibility should depend on
the nature of the risks involved, their obviousness, and the reasons for
the defendant's lack of perception or disregard of those risks. '245 He
reasons that "[w]e judge persons according to their choices, on the
assumption that they are responsible for the motivations which drive
those choices.... Motivations to perceive, or not perceive, therefore,
should be considered part of the individual's base responsibility,"
even when those motivations are neither consciously nor freely chosen
and instead stem from genetic "hard wiring" or the unchosen
environments in which we are raised.246  Thus, "[w]e may blame
persons for failing to perceive risks to others when we can trace their
lack of awareness to bad perception priorities," such as assigning too
low a priority to the value of human life.247 When people act in ways
that display such "serious disregard for the moral worth" of others,
Pillsbury concludes that we may-indeed should-punish them
criminally.248
He specifically explores the concept of indifference as a form of
mens rea in the law of rape. He notes that American courts
essentially require participants in sexual intercourse to make a
significant effort to determine their partners' desires, because an
unreasonable mistake about consent is not sufficient to constitute an
excuse for nonconsensual intercourse, and sometimes even a
reasonable mistake will not exonerate. This illustrates that awareness
of nonconsent is considered too narrow a standard for rape in the
United States.249 Pillsbury concludes, "A person may display serious
241. Id. at 144-45.
242. Id. at 148.
243. Id. at 149.
244. Id. at 106.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 150-51.
247. Id. at 151.
248. Id. at 152.
249. Id. at 173. With only a few exceptions, this appears to be the case. See supra
note 63 and accompanying text.
2002]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
indifference to another-enough to deserve criminal punishment-
and yet lack actual awareness of nonconsent. 251
Pillsbury's indifference idea appears tailor-made for the facts of the
Sansregret case. Certainly the defendant displayed a serious enough
indifference to the moral worth of his victim as to deserve criminal
punishment, even if he lacked actual awareness of the coerced nature
of her consent. It is possible that his unawareness stemmed from
some personal motivation that affected his attention to the otherwise
obvious facts. If so, Pillsbury suggests we should inquire why the
defendant was unaware. In his reasoning, we are criminally
responsible for the motivations that affect our choices of what to
perceive or attend to, even when those motivations are part of our
unchosen personality. Since, as a result of his (possibly unchosen)
motivations, Sansregret may have chosen not to attend to the facts
that rendered his victim's consent coerced, and since that choice
reflected a serious disregard for the moral worth of another, he
displayed the kind of indifference for which he ought to be criminally
responsible.
On the other hand, it is possible that Sansregret's unawareness of
coerced consent did not stem from his failure to attend to (that is, take
conscious note of) the relevant facts. Perhaps, instead, he was fully
aware of all the facts but exercised inappropriate judgment about
their significance, and thus reached the flawed conclusion that consent
was not coerced. To put it another way, perhaps he was unaware of
the ultimate fact of coerced consent, though aware of the contributing
facts that indicated the ultimate fact. If this was the problem, then it
would not really seem to be his perception or attention that was at
fault, but rather his reasoning, that is, his mental manipulation of the
facts which he perceived and to which he was attending. In short,
perhaps Sansregret's situation does not really fall within Pillsbury's
indifference construct, as the construct relates to failures of
perception or attention and not to faulty reason. Or, perhaps,
Pillsbury is still on point, because Sansregret still did not attend to the
ultimate fact of coerced consent.
In the end, this distinction should not make very much difference
for Sansregret's responsibility or even for Pillsbury's larger point
about indifference. Reasoning, even more clearly than perception or
attention, reflects choice. Extrapolating from Pillsbury, even if
Sansregret's faulty reasoning stemmed from unchosen personal
motivations, we should hold him criminally responsible for the choices
he made, in this case, choices to credit certain (perceived and attended
to) facts more than others. Thus, if he was unaware of the ultimate
fact of coerced consent, he should nevertheless be responsible if that
unawareness was the result of choices about which perceived facts to
250. Pillsbury, supra note 84, at 174.
[Vol. 71
ANATOMY OFA RAPE
credit, and those choices reflected a serious disregard for the moral
worth of his victim. If, on the other hand, his choices about how to
weigh the perceived and attended to facts did not reflect a serious
disregard for the moral worth of his victim's bodily integrity, then
presumably he should not be guilty because of his lack of knowledge
of coerced consent.
It seems that much, maybe most, maybe almost all negligent
behavior could become criminal under Pillsbury's construct."' Only
inattention or unawareness that stemmed from a morally acceptable
choice not to attend, or about how to weigh the evidence, would
escape liability. In rape, particularly coerced consent rape, what
would that be? Not realizing that you had coerced another into
consenting to intercourse despite a risk that others would have
perceived (negligence) would seem virtually always to stem from
indifference to the other person's physical or psychological
independence and integrity. In most of the Western world today, that
is not a morally acceptable motivation. As for nonconsensual rape,
there again do not appear to be many (or perhaps any) instances in
which the motivation for not attending to those factors, obvious to
others, that indicate nonconsent would be anything other than
indifference to the value or integrity of another.
Pillsbury provides as an example of a criminally innocent lack of
attention a father who runs a red light, fatally injuring another, in
order to rush his severely injured child to the hospital.252 He contrasts
this to a teenager who runs the red light while showing off to
friends. 3 The teenager's negligent conduct demonstrates indifference
to the moral worth of others, while the father's demonstrates a tragic
conflict between valuing his child and valuing others. 4 It is difficult
to translate this homicide example to rape, as it is difficult to imagine
a case in which one must choose between having intercourse with
someone who might not be consenting and some other moral
imperative. Someone might misattend to nonconsent to intercourse
because he is preoccupied dealing with a personal tragedy, but that is
not the same morally acceptable motivation as that of the hypothetical
father who needed to do the criminal act (run the red light) in order to
secure some other, competing moral good. If there are virtually no
instances of non-indifferent negligent rape, the argument for
indifference as the appropriate standard for nonconsent or coerced
consent in rape then seems to boil down to an argument that
negligence is the proper mens rea for rape overall. As discussed
251. Although Pillsbury does not argue for universal application of his theory, and
confines his conclusions to the limited case of inadvertent homicide, he recognizes the
larger significance of the issues he raises. Id. at 107,111-12.
252. Id. at 151-52.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 152.
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immediately above and in Part II.A, negligence, or at least something
less than knowledge, may well be an appropriate culpable mental state
for rape.255
The question remains, however, whether rape is just a special case
because knowledge was never a good mens rea, or whether there is
something to the indifference idea that could make a meaningful
difference with regard to other knowledge-level crimes. Would
indifference work as a proper mens rea for the remaining knowledge-
level crimes? The answer should depend on how many and which
reckless and negligent acts related to what are now knowledge-level
crimes we might want to punish criminally. As suggested above, we
do not want simply to alter the mens rea of every crime requiring
knowledge." 6 Sometimes there are reasons to prefer knowledge over
the current alternatives. Would separating out and also punishing the
more callously indifferent instances of reckless and negligent
behaviors make sense?
At the threshold, the ambiguous nature of the indifference inquiry
raises issues. First, logistically, juries, the usual criminal fact-finders,
presumably would be asked to make determinations of motivation.
Did Mr. X take Mr. Y's umbrella negligently (unaware that it was
someone else's property when he should have been aware) because he
was indifferent to the moral worth of someone else's interests, or
because of the heartrending conflict of needing the umbrella to shield
his sick child from the rain? If he needed to shield his healthy but
young child, would that qualify as a sufficiently morally acceptable
reason to fail to attend to the property interests of others? One
problem with employing indifference as a general standard for
culpability is that most negligent actors are indifferent to the interests
of others. This would mean that in every case of at least negligent
conduct, which is almost every case, jurors would be asked to explore
the reasons for the defendant's indifference, as well as the presumably
relevant level of indifference and the kind of interest to which he was
indifferent, before deciding whether criminal liability should attach. It
seems problematic to ask jurors in every case of negligent conduct not
only to make determinations of motivation, but to make a moral
assessment about them as well.
Second, the ambiguity just illustrated could render the criminal law
too indeterminate altogether. A basic precept of criminal law is that it
must give potential offenders notice of which behaviors will be
considered legal transgressions. The indifference approach adds
another layer of murkiness to existing mens rea standards by
introducing a very explicit moral judgment about subjective
255. Professor Schulhofer argues that reckless and negligent rape look the same in
practice, and that recklessness is a perfectly proper criminal mens rea in general and
for rape in particular. Schulhofer, AALS Address, supra note 66.
256. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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motivation into the determination of guilt or innocence.2 7 Even more
troublesome is the fact that the very same arguments offered for using
indifference as a standard could be asserted for using any motivation-
based, ergo morality-based, standard. It seems difficult to imagine
how to cabin this standard, once it is introduced as a general guiding
principle. Using indifference as a mens rea is different, but not all that
different, from simply asking in each instance whether we think the
particular person's particular behavior worthy of criminal
condemnation. Such a standard would threaten to turn criminality
into an ad hoc, and post hoc, determination.
The idea of using indifference also seems inevitably to come back
around to the arguments previously made for retaining knowledge as
the mens rea for some crimes. If it is sometimes appropriate only to
punish those who knew, should it really matter whether reckless and
negligent performers of the same acts were morally lax or not in being
reckless or negligent? In order to employ indifference analysis more
widely than Pillsbury explicitly advocates for unintended homicides,
the answer would need to be that we care to ensnare in the criminal
net not only those who knew, and those who were willfully ignorant,
but also those who did not know because their callous indifference to
some moral value, such as the moral worth of others' interests,
affected their perceptions.
In some specific instances this standard has appeal. Consider the
recent Enron debacle. 8 It is certainly tempting to contemplate that
corporate executives or their possibly complicit accountants could be
thrown in jail for raiding the company treasury using self-serving deals
of questionable value to the entity, and causing the consequent
worthlessness of shareholders' investments and employees' pensions.
Apparently one of the factors contributing to the scandal was use of a
financial device called asset securitization that, if properly executed,
257. Pillsbury recognizes this particular difficulty:
The indifference approach does commit the law to an explicitly moral
standard. Each of the proposed offense definitions asks the jury to make a
normative judgment about whether the defendant displayed a culpable lack
of concern for others' physical well-being. As we have seen, overtly moral
standards permit a significant degree of decision maker discretion, an
uncomfortable prospect in our heterogenous [sic] society. Yet what are the
alternatives?
Pillsbury, supra note 84, at 215-16. In defense, he argues that legislatures cannot
predict the range of factual situations that would meet the standard, so the issue must
be left for ad hoc determination. Id. at 216. Also, traditional recklessness and
negligence, as well as depraved heart murder statutes, utilize explicitly moral
determinations. Id. Finally, cautionary jury instructions can be used to insure against
jurors use of indifference evidence to render judgment based on the defendant's
general character instead of the facts of the case. Id.
258. For descriptions of the scandal, see, for example, Jenny B. Davis, The Enron
Factor, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2002, at 40; Jonathan D. Glater, Enron's Collapse: The
Vulnerable, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 2002, at C1O; Eric Lichtblau & David G. Savage, The
Fall of Enron, L.A. Times, Jan. 28,2002, at Al.
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would allow assets to be transferred off a company's balance sheet. It
has been suggested that Enron's auditors certified that some such
deals were completed in accordance with generally accepted
accounting and auditing principles when in fact they were not." 9 If
these accountants knew they were certifying falsely to the use of such
principles in the preparation of required financial reports, they might
be said to have "willfully" violated the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, exposing themselves to criminal liability.26 But if they did not
know and were only reckless about the false certification that
generally accepted accounting principles were used, they would not be
guilty of a crime.26" ' Let's suppose the auditors did not know, but only
because their perceptive priorities filtered out suspicious information
in a self-serving way, and further suppose that in failing to attend to
the falsity of their assurances, they displayed callous indifference to
the financial interests of the employees and other shareholders.
Wouldn't it seem morally satisfying if the callously indifferent Enron
auditors were guilty, as they would be under Pillsbury's indifference
approach? It will usually seem morally satisfying that callously
indifferent people be guilty of a crime, at least when knowing people
would be.
To test this standard in a possibly less engaging context, let's return
to the earlier example of someone who draws a check with insufficient
funds in the bank.262 Suppose he does not know he has insufficient
funds, but he is reckless about that fact, that is, he is aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that he does not have enough money
to cover the check. Under present law, he is not guilty of a bad check
offense. However, using the indifference standard, his guilt will
259. See Kurt Eichenwald, U.S. Inquiry Tracks Insiders at Enron, N.Y. Times, Apr.
15, 2002, at Al; Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Enron's Many Strands: Early Warnings, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 7, 2002, at Al.
260. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2001) (outlawing willful and knowing false or
misleading statements that one makes or causes to be made in any document required
to be filed under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or under any rule or regulation
promulgated under the Act). An accountant or auditor's "knowing" failure to comply
with generally accepted accounting principles and/or generally accepted auditing
standards in connection with audits of publicly traded companies may subject these
professionals to prosecution for violation of the securities laws. See, e.g., United
States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 777-87 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Natelli, 527
F.2d 311, 320 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 805-06 (2d Cir.
1969).
261. "Knowledge... is required under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 when
the criminal charge is premised upon a false or misleading statement of any material
fact in any application, report, or document required to be filed under the Act," Ellen
S. Podgor, White Collar Crime in a Nutshell § 5.02, at 81 (2d ed. 1997); accord United
States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1396-97 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Simon, 425
F.2d at 809, although some courts have found reckless indifference sufficient to
constitute the necessary "willfulness" under other criminal provisions of the securities
laws, Podgor, supra, at 79; accord United States v. Boyer, 694 F.2d 58, 59-60 (3d Cir.
1982) (finding recklessness sufficient for a criminal violation of 15 U.S.C. § 77x).
262. See supra notes 183-92 and accompanying text.
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depend on whether his unawareness that he had insufficient funds was
the result of his callous indifference to the property interest of the
payee, or the result of some other, morally acceptable justification. If
he wrote the check, not knowing whether he had sufficient funds, in
order to obtain medical services for his gravely ill child, not from
indifference to the payee's interest but agonizing over it, by
extrapolating from Pillsbury's example, that might qualify as a morally
acceptable counterweight. If he needed only to give his girlfriend a
birthday present, presumably that would not qualify. What if he
needed to keep his family housed for another month? Needed to feed
his child? Needed to feed his cat? Case by case moral judgments
about such matters would presumably determine guilt.
It is not surprising that indifferent, especially callously indifferent,
actors will often appear to warrant criminal sanction. In a way, the
present taxonomy of criminal mens rea is an attempt-perhaps too
crude an attempt-to identify callous indifference at the wholesale
level.263  Knowledge is both over- and under-inclusive. It will
inculpate some who did not act out of callous indifference to the
interests of others, and, as in the present Enron, Sansregret, and bad
check examples, exculpate some who did. We currently stop at the
wholesale level when we conclude, for knowledge-level crimes, that
the actor's callousness must be evidenced by his awareness of the evil-
identifying fact in question. At the retail level, if we look at every
potentially criminal act in its complete factual context, many reckless
and even negligent actors will seem to be sufficiently culpable for
punishment, and at the other end, a few knowing and purposeful
actors will not. Pillsbury's indifference standard is appealing because
it expressly incorporates a factor-callous indifference-that
constructs like knowledge or purposefulness only approximate.
But the virtue of indifference is also its vice. One problem with
employing it as a standard is precisely that it invites decision about
guilt or innocence at the retail level.2" If indifference is to be the
measure of criminality, we need not assume that even knowing actors
are callously indifferent, for some of them, too, may have acted for
morally justified reasons. Indeed, even those who purposefully kill
someone may have acted in the face of an understandable moral
dilemma.265 Indifference would seem to become not an adjunct to
current mens rea standards, but rather a substitute for them. While
perhaps theoretically justified, there are great dangers of uncertainty
and instability in using such a standard outright. As discussed above,
the standard is premised on fact-finders making expressly subjective,
ad hoc, moral judgments. Determinations of an actor's awareness of
263. See Charlow, supra note 66, at 1391-95.
264. Pillsbury takes note of this in the limited context in which he urges adoption of
the concept. Pillsbury, supra note 84, at 215-16.
265. See, e.g., Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884) (Eng.).
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some fact must also be made in each case, and are aimed at fleshing
out a subjective state, but they hopefully do not call for the explicit
use of the fact-finders' own personal moral assessments of the
particular act or actor. Callous indifference may be a better or more
accurate measure of the appropriate bounds of moral responsibility,
and thus criminality, than such imperfect substitutes as purpose,
knowledge, or recklessness, but it seems less or even wholly
unworkable.
2. Indifference as a Punishment Consideration
Maybe a better way to employ indifference analysis would be to
incorporate it into consideration of punishment rather than into
determination of guilt.266  Stephen Garvey's recent account of
"wicked" and "vicious" wrongs could be used to explain this.267
Garvey argues that wrongs, which are criminal, differ from harms,
which are not, because they add a moral injury to an otherwise only
material injury. That moral injury is the symbolic message of
contempt, insult, dishonor, disrespect, or the like that one conveys
when one considers himself free to pursue his own ends at the expense
of someone else's, effectively saying "I'm better than you," or "I count
but you do not. '26" According to Garvey, there are two kinds of
wrongs punished by the criminal law: Wicked wrongdoers believe
that what they are doing is wrong, but put the pursuit of their own
ends above the call of conscience. 6 Vicious wrongdoers fail to live up
to the criminal law's standard of virtue (that of a reasonable person),
but do not act in defiance of their conscience and do not convey a
message of contempt for their victims. 271' Rather, vicious wrongdoers
may act out of weakness (an inability to exercise the self-control a
virtuous person would) or mistake (failure to realize the wrong that a
virtuous person would appreciate).2 71 Garvey concludes that, since
wicked wrongs convey a message of insult or contempt for the victim
266. This is essentially what occurred in the infamous case of Regina v. Dudley and
Stephens, id., in which dying, shipwrecked seamen resorted to cannibalism of one of
their number in order to save some of their lives. After the jury was unable to reach a
verdict on guilt, a specially convened court deemed the defendants criminally
responsible and sentenced them to death, but the sentence was commuted to a six
month prison term in view of the extreme extenuating circumstances of the particular
homicide. See Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Case Studies: Teacher's Manual 23
(2002). In effect, the defendants were understood to have acted because of an
overwhelming moral dilemma rather than out of callous indifference to the moral
worth of their victim. This factor eventually entered into sentencing consideration,
but was not considered legally relevant to the determination of guilt.
267. Stephen P. Garvey, Two Kinds of Criminal Wrongs (Apr. 2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review).
268. Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted).
269. Id. at 6.
270. Id. at 11-12.
271. Id. at 12.
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and hubris in the wrongdoer, the proper penance or punishment for
such wrongs should send a message of humility.27 2 In contrast, since
vicious wrongs convey only lack of virtue, penance for them should
demonstrate efforts or resolve to learn to live up to the expected
norm. 
273
When indifference causes a failure of perception or attention, it
would seem that it results in a vicious wrong. Indifferent actors have
made a mistake, that is, owing to their failure of perception or
attention, they have failed to appreciate the wrong that a virtuous
person would have understood. Arguably something like vicious
wrongdoing could characterize Sansregret's act; owing to his failure to
analyze the facts appropriately, he failed to appreciate, as a virtuous
person would have, that he had coerced consent.
On the other hand, it could also be said that indifference to the
moral worth of another characterizes the wicked wrongdoer, who acts
in disregard or in contempt of that other's interest. Again using
Sansregret as the example, his indifference to the moral value of his
ex-girlfriend's integrity displayed a serious disregard or contempt for
her interests. But the wicked wrongdoer is also supposed to have
acted against his conscience. This assumes an awareness of
wrongdoing supposedly lacking in one who lacks knowledge of the
wrong-indicative fact. In Sansregret's case, he allegedly lacked
knowledge that he had coerced consent, and so he did not act with
conscious appreciation of wrongdoing. Perhaps instead he acted out
of a peculiar kind of conscience, one that views it as appropriate to
have intercourse with anyone under any circumstance who says they
want to have sex, even if you've just beaten them and frightened them
out of their wits. Garvey calls one who employs a twisted moral code,
contrary to the generally accepted one, a "conscientiously wicked"
wrongdoer.274 Such a person acts immorally, but does not see it that
way because he is truly ignorant of certain basic moral propositions.
If Sansregret fell into this category, Garvey would view him as still
culpable, because virtuous people do not suffer from such ignorance,
but categorize him as a vicious rather than wicked wrongdoer.275 It is
difficult to say whether Sansregret acted more from a mistake about
the facts than out of a conscientious but twisted morality. In either
event, penance for the vicious wrongdoer would be in order.
If Sansregret is a vicious wrongdoer, Garvey suggests that we
should punish him by having him commit to a process of self-reform
that would attempt to enable him to live up to the standard of virtue
the criminal law expects, rather than humble himself by showing his
recognition that he is not better than his victim or others. There are
272. Id. at 16.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 6.
275. Id. at 7.
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two potential problems with trying to apply Garvey's construct to this
situation. First, identifying a process of self-reform that would correct
errors of perception or attention or reasoning would seem at least
sometimes to be confounding, especially for people who have spent a
lifetime operating under flawed perceptual or analytical mindsets.
Perhaps we could teach Sansregret to appreciate that women deserve
respect, and that those who are terrorized are not being treated with
respect. But when we get down to the level of perceptual mistakes as
opposed to mistakes in judgment or reasoning, it seems more difficult
to correct well-embedded, systematic flaws. This is not to say that
Garvey is wrong, but only that it may be difficult to translate his
theory into efficacious practice.
Second, and more problematic for resolving what to do with
Sansregret and his ilk, Garvey's useful taxonomy of wrongdoing and
consequently appropriate punishment assumes guilt. The trouble we
began with is that some vicious wrongdoers, like Sansregret, lack the
required mens rea of knowledge, and therefore will not have
committed a crime under existing law. Garvey's considerations would
enter the picture only if and after Sansregret were otherwise guilty of
a crime; they do not readily point to a method for insuring that he
would be guilty in the first instance.
Perhaps some combination of Pillsbury's idea of indifference and
Garvey's idea of differential punishment would be ideal. That is, we
could add indifference as a culpable mental state, and then allow only
for punishments of the sort Garvey would apply to ignorant but
vicious wrongdoers, punishments different from those applied to
knowing, wicked wrongdoers. This amalgamation would render
Sansregret guilty, but would still not alleviate all the previously
discussed problems inherent in adopting an indifference standard. In
short, Garvey's theory of different criminal wrongs and punishments
might be usefully analyzed together with Pillsbury's indifference
analysis, but it does not solve the problem of implicating some, but
not too many, non-knowing but clearly bad actors.
CONCLUSION
Sometimes we encounter people who do obviously bad things, for
which criminal punishment seems in order, but who do not act with
the guilty mental state required for conviction of the pertinent crime.
Knowledge-level crimes, for which awareness of some relevant fact
must be established, seem particularly susceptible areas for such
slippage to occur. Under existing rules, some bad acts-like the rape
described at the outset of this paper, or the callously indifferent
certification of flawed Enron financial statements that arguably led to
the loss of millions in investments and pension funds-would escape
criminal condemnation, unless, as in the rape case that was analyzed,
judges misapply the rules to fit the facts or twist the facts to fit the
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rules. These are clearly not ideal resolutions.
Several other options could result in criminal liability for such bad
acts. First, we could alter the required mens rea for the crimes
involved so that something less than knowledge is sufficient for
conviction. However, this would mean reducing the culpable mental
state for many crimes for which a knowledge requirement is still
generally desirable. Second, we could alter the definition of willful
blindness, a current knowledge-substitute, so that it covers these bad
acts. But this would pervert a long-established doctrine, and might
not serve to inculpate the desired behavior in any event. Third, we
could create a wholly new culpable mental state that encompasses the
state of mind actually involved. While this might be desirable in
theory, there are both practical and conceptual obstacles to adopting
at least one promising candidate-indifference-found in the
literature. Attempts to use this indifference analysis to fashion a
particularly suitable punishment instead might be more workable, but
would still not solve the problem of inculpation.
It may seem disappointing to conclude that we cannot punish some
clearly bad acts, at least not in a principled way, absent existing mens
rea. But there is little point in adopting a cure that could prove worse
than the disease.
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